But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for
robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first
campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also,
which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he
was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a
general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely
lost the consciousness of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that
he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and
that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general.
Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the
same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s
consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore,
according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged.
There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person
with him who was flogged at a school.
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei
> <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>
> > wrote:
>
>> You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman
>> thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's
>> view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you
>> keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists.
>> Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth
>> preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed
>> individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought
>> experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea
>> that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being
>>
>
> I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your
> current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the
> same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then
> there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that
> doesn't exist between me and anyone else.
>
> (Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)
>
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