Also would you bite the bullet that if i where to erase your personal memories then torture your body it wouldnt count as torturing you?
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote: > But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive... > > Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for > robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first > campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, > which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he > was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a > general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely > lost the consciousness of his flogging. > These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, > that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, > and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a > general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the > general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the > general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, > therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was > flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same > person with him who was flogged at a school. > > > On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> > wrote: > >> On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman >>> thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's >>> view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you >>> keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. >>> Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth >>> preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed >>> individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought >>> experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea >>> that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being >>> >> >> I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your >> current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the >> same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then >> there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that >> doesn't exist between me and anyone else. >> >> (Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
