Hi Dennis, I'm not familiar with Parfit and the other theoricians you guys have been talking about, but the concepts around self being bandied around seem so black and white. Dennis, you say self cannot be graded but why? My self when I am drunk is different than my self when I am sober, but this is temporary. And if the idea of self is so brittle that it shatters from falling asleep, then why stop at sleep? From one minute to the next, if I choose a precise enough notion of self, I am a different person. What is the principle that allows me to choose how precisely to define it?
In my view, self is not merely memory, or bounded by skin. It is an autopoietic construct, a living system that incorporates memories and is embodied in some "physical" form (where "physical" is general enough to include the virtual). Its defining characterization is that of persistent organization. It is a body, but in the memetic domain. Just as we don't go around saying that we have different bodies from one day to the next, so it is with the self. If there is a notion of self that is inclusive of all of us, a "global self", then we don't have access to that in the same way that my individual cells would not have access to my self. I see no reason to doubt that there is or could be a "global self" but if it exists, it has its own persistent organization and its own experience of reality. Terren On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 12:27 PM, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]>wrote: > Parfit denies the existence of personal identity altogether, what is left > merely psychological and biological relatedness relations. > > Personal identity works if everyone is one person, but i dont want to be > forced by my view of personal continuity to be an extreme altruist > > Personal identity works if I am solely me right now but that is nearly as > bad as the open case, as I have no real good reason to care more about my > future self than others. > > The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be > graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who > is merely like me will. But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or > gain of a single memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty > view, if i can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the > open view > > > On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote: >> >> But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive... >> >> >> Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series, and >> that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the paper I >> refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this list (I explain >> this since many years). >> >> We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and the >> guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet they are >> not the same guy after the duplication. There is no paradox. The usual >> identity criterion is given by the personal memories and their structured >> integration. >> >> >> >> >> Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for >> robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first >> campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, >> which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he >> was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a >> general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely >> lost the consciousness of his flogging. >> These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, >> that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, >> and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a >> general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the >> general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the >> general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, >> therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was >> flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same >> person with him who was flogged at a school. >> >> >> No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it shows >> that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism. That is >> plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G* justify to be a >> notion or person canonically attached to any (universal) machine. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman >>>> thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's >>>> view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you >>>> keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. >>>> Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth >>>> preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed >>>> individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought >>>> experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea >>>> that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being >>>> >>> >>> I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your >>> current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the >>> same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then >>> there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that >>> doesn't exist between me and anyone else. >>> >>> (Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> Sent from Gmail Mobile >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
