On 15 May 2014, at 05:43, Dennis Ochei wrote:
You can still care if you die normally but something like the
swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival
under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to
accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to
be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation
preserve everything worth preserving.
That is the computationalist assumption, which is the assumption from
which I derive that physics is a branch of machine's psychology or
theology.
That you are what once was is purely an illusion.
But a "real illusion", which obeys mathematical law, due to computer
science.
Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when
subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's
view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same
consciousness that you remember being
Why. On the contrary, that is used to understand that we are all the
same consciousness to begin with.
Bruno
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 15 May 2014 04:33, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote:
But that's exactly the point. Consciousness, if construed as the
container of conscious experience (or the surface upon which
experience is written) has no principle of individuation--all
conscious experiencers abstracted from their experience are
identical. For this reason a consciousness swap is as meaningless as
swapping the location of two electrons or shifting the universe 6
feet to the left. This is not at all the route Kolak takes to his
conclusion, but suffices as a quick exposition of why one would
entertain the position. In short, patterns (complex organisms)
emerge in the universe that allow the universe to be conscious of
itself. All consciousness is one part of the universe experiencing
another part of itself as other.
Course, one could also take the position that there is no
experiencer independent of the experience. The experiencer and the
experienced are one. In which case you are identical solely with
yourself right this moment, and what will wake up in your bed
tomorrow will not be you, but something that is merely like you in
many ways. Under this view you now and you tomorrow are different
persons. This is the view pushed by Parfit.
I am sympathetic to Parfit's view, but it doesn't change the way I
feel about things. For example, to be consistent I shouldn't care if
I die, since I die anyway even if my tomorrow self seems to persist;
however, I do care if I die.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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