On 5/15/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:
On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote:
Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a
"person" is
a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last
somewhere around
1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would
still hold)
and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories.
I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' refers
only to
conscious thoughts. Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information processing,
may take
longer and overlap and occur in different parts of the brain. Just because
they are
not conscious thoughts, I don't think we can ignore them. After all,
acting from
habit, "without thinking", is part of a person's character.
There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some point the subconscious
thoughts have conscious consequences, and /those/ are part of the "person moment". The
rest is like memory retrieval, for example - at some point the memory becomes conscious,
and contributes to a PM.
The implicit assumptions are that there is something important about consciousness (i.e.
eliminative materialism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism>is wrong),
plus the idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally I'm agnostic on
these points.)
Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but
comp-style
thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is
whether
physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental
(i.e. nature
hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the
importance of
physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells,
apparently
- every few hours/days/years/whatever.
I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact
that
they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar important
to who we
are?
We do, apparently.
http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
(I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make you think that this
ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the capsule theory of identity says that
functional similarity is important to who we are and that it's important on a far
shorter timescale than brain cell replacement. (Or is this just another of those "buts"
you like to throw in occasionally when not actually disagreeing? :)
And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do
something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a
visit to
the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without
being lost
from the system.
Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same
species are
strictly identical. The question is whether the brain could be implemented
in some
completely different medium and still instantiate the same consciousness.
I think
it could only do so approximately - so it might be close enough to fool
your friends
but still not be exactly you. But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no
physical instantiation is needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of
those
computations is enough? I think the argument only proves that there could
be
another world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the physics of
that
world, e.g. Turing machine computations.
Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct - i.e. whether "yes
doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if there is nothing supernatural
involved, if physical continuity isn't important (which requires that eliminativism is
wrong, I think), and if there aren't any infinities getting in the way of perfect
duplication (e.g. if space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even
in an infinite universe).
And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution. Certainly we don't need exact
substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, much less year to year. But I
think we need to be embedded in a physical environment with which we interact.
If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then it should be
possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an infinite universe, in other
parts of the multiverse, in computer simulations,
I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around him - which I
suspect is A LOT.
and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking about and
computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia).
I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia instantiation
there will have to be a "world" instantiated there to. I don't think a consciousness can
exist in isolation (at least not without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a
simulated world with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia. But how is that different
from a world outside Platonia? How is it different from this world? "Simulated" doesn't
really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's
"The Cyberiad"?).
Brent
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