On 16 May 2014, at 06:41, Dennis Ochei wrote:

The more I think about the subjective expectation question the more meaningless it becomes. I'm not asking if a future person is physically or psychologically like me, I know the answer to that. In fact, even if I knew every physical fact about a body and had a complete knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness I still wouldn't know if it was realizing my consciousness or a consciousness that is merely precisely like mine. This question of whether a past or future experience did or will belong to me is distinctly extraphysical.

This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).

Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington? This is used implicitly in Everett Quantum mechanics, but with computationalism, that you accept, this extends to the space of all subjective experience realized in elementary arithmetic.

It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n times.

Bruno





On Thursday, May 15, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 16 May 2014 15:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/15/2014 6:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 16 May 2014 13:02, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>
> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact > > that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar
> > important to who we are?
> >
> > We do, apparently.
> 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
>
> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
>

I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in
cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons.

It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
is around 7 years, or something like that.

So physical continuity may be important, in which case it's possible "yes doctor" is a bad bet.
It's all relative. If the alternative is dying of liver cancer it might still be a good bet.

If physical continuity is important, these aren't alternatives.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to [email protected] .
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
Sent from Gmail Mobile

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to