> This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).
I want to grok this statement can you give me more? Why is physics an illusion > Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington? I'm down with that > It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n times. Don't get this either, but I haven't finished the paper, so maybe that will illuminate things On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 May 2014, at 06:41, Dennis Ochei wrote: > > The more I think about the subjective expectation question the more > meaningless it becomes. I'm not asking if a future person is physically or > psychologically like me, I know the answer to that. In fact, even if I knew > every physical fact about a body and had a complete knowledge of the neural > correlates of consciousness I still wouldn't know if it was realizing my > consciousness or a consciousness that is merely precisely like mine. This > question of whether a past or future experience did or will belong to me > is distinctly extraphysical. > > > This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that > the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular > important one that no machines can avoid (statistically). > > Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when > you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington? > This is used implicitly in Everett Quantum mechanics, but with > computationalism, that you accept, this extends to the space of all > subjective experience realized in elementary arithmetic. > > It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication > leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained > when the duplication experiment is repeated n times. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Thursday, May 15, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 16 May 2014 15:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 5/15/2014 6:06 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 16 May 2014 13:02, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote: >>>> > >>>> > I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't >>>> the fact >>>> > > that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar >>>> > > important to who we are? >>>> > > >>>> > > We do, apparently. >>>> > >>>> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis >>>> > >>>> > (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?) >>>> > >>>> >>>> I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in >>>> cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons. >>>> >>>> It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable >>>> long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric >>>> nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand, >>>> but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years >>>> younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age >>>> is around 7 years, or something like that. >>>> >>> >>> So physical continuity may be important, in which case it's possible >>> "yes doctor" is a bad bet. >>> >>> It's all relative. If the alternative is dying of liver cancer it >>> might still be a good bet. >>> >> >> If physical continuity is important, these aren't alternatives. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Dennis Ochei Baylor College of Medicine '18 Duke University '13 Neuroscience/Computer Science, Music 3♭ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
