On 23 May 2014, at 14:00, [email protected] wrote:
On Friday, May 23, 2014 9:03:00 AM UTC+1, Kim Jones wrote:
> On 22 May 2014, at 11:57 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Can you at least confirm that you pretend to have a refutation of
comp
The word 'pretend' here is a "false friend". Bruno is assuming that
this word works the same in English as in French. It doesn't.
He means only modestly "Can you at least confirm that you CLAIM to
have a refutation of comp?"
thanks for this Kim....I didn't know the difference. But at the same
time, I wasn't too bothered about the meaning, but more that here
things were again exactly where they were right at the start. I
meant right at the very first post I made on this matter.
I've been saying that it isn't necessary to refute something that
contains no knowledge about something fundamental to its claim.
If only you make specific point that I can relate with my saying. May
be it is the "english", but I fail to see what you meant.
Consciousness was never understood...and it's reasonable to think it
is the more important mystery of computation, than anything
contained in the discovery of computers, so far.
But the term "computation" admit a mathematical definition thanks to
the discovery of the universal machines, and thanks to Church Thesis,
which makes them genuinely universal.
Then computationalism relates consciousness to the working of a
computer, and allow to reason on consciousness (without the need to
define it, as we can use semi-axiomatic definitions, like a form of
non justifiable knowledge that we suppose invariant for a set of
digital transformations).
It would be like, as I said, assuming something vast about matter in
1700 before anything about matter had been discovered, and building
streams of logic from that along.
That is what the greek did, and this is what has led to science. Also,
the theory of matter that I recovered is the theory of Aristotle,
reshaped in the Platonist realm by Plotinus.
I find plausible that if the academy of Plato did not close in 523, we
would have discovered Church thesis and quantum mechanics 10 centuries
before. (But I will not try to argue on this, it is just my feeling
coming from my reading of Plato and Aristotle, and some others).
What we'd have missed out on, was the discovery of chemistry, the
scientific method and eventually atoms and QM, if we'd gone a way
like that. Why would it be any different here?
I still miss what it is that is your problem. You make remarks which I
am unable to relate to what I explain.
Hmm... rereading your post, I see that you never answer my specific
question. You go on the tangent, and make side remarks which I think
are distracting from the point discussed.
I intend to make a post (to Liz, Brent, and people interested)
summarizing the main representation theorems used in the derivation of
physics from elementary arithmetic (with comp at the meta level). May
be it will be helpful for you too.
You might answer the question: are you OK with the fact that quantum
logic is empirical, and can be tested. Are you are that Bell's theorem
shows the existence of a refutation of a boolean tautology. If PA (or
any Löbian machine) proves that tautology or any other of that kind,
when using the definition of observation provided, then the classical
comp thesis is falsified. That can happen in different ways, some of
which can be fatal, and others would suggests a refinement of the
theory of knowledge.
Bruno
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