On 23 May 2014, at 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
On Friday, May 23, 2014 1:00:26 PM UTC+1, [email protected] wrote:
On Friday, May 23, 2014 9:03:00 AM UTC+1, Kim Jones wrote:
> On 22 May 2014, at 11:57 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Can you at least confirm that you pretend to have a refutation of
comp
The word 'pretend' here is a "false friend". Bruno is assuming that
this word works the same in English as in French. It doesn't.
He means only modestly "Can you at least confirm that you CLAIM to
have a refutation of comp?"
thanks for this Kim....I didn't know the difference. But at the same
time, I wasn't too bothered about the meaning, but more that here
things were again exactly where they were right at the start. I
meant right at the very first post I made on this matter.
I've been saying that it isn't necessary to refute something that
contains no knowledge about something fundamental to its claim.
Consciousness was never understood...and it's reasonable to think it
is the more important mystery of computation, than anything
contained in the discovery of computers, so far. It would be like,
as I said, assuming something vast about matter in 1700 before
anything about matter had been discovered, and building streams of
logic from that along. What we'd have missed out on, was the
discovery of chemistry, the scientific method and eventually atoms
and QM, if we'd gone a way like that. Why would it be any different
here?
I think the confusion between views may hard to straighten out. I'm
not suggesting there's anything wrong with making a conjecture that
is short on knowledge. The issue is about what can reasonably be
done with any conclusions. If everyone is reasonable, it can be a
fruitful contribution over time.
The risk, as I mentioned before, is that people won't be reasonable.
And so small and large theories show up that build over the top of
that low knowledge conjecture. And they are exciting theories, of
course, because they appear to be in the scientific stream but are
no longer constrained the way science has been to date, to mass hard
knowledge at the base before building over the top. So they are free
to go anywhere, and they typically do.
And no one is looking too hard at that original conjecture, because
now it looks like a hard historical link built into a major arterial
thread of hard science. And later on - down the line - predictions,
new technology and major advances dry up.
I cannot relate this with anything in our conversation. Sorry. It
looks you are not aware of the hard science known as mathematical
logic, theoretical computer science, and even of the use of physics
for the confirmation/refutation of computationalism.
But Bruno, and others, have chosen to argue the point. If people
think it's bullshit (as opposed to pretending French sense), or
whatever....they shouldn't encourage the discussion. I'm not badger
people...if they aren't interested in what I have to say, I'll move
on and say something thing sometime.
But just as I don't expect anyone to back down other than when they
see the point, no one should expect me to. All I've had back from
Bruno....99% of the time, is blanket dismissal that he's no clue
what I'm talking about. That's just going to make me take him at his
word, and look for a better way to say it.
If you want communicate something, please fell free. But in our
conversation, sometimes you talk like if you were dismissing results
from the literature, and when asked specific question, you don't answer.
May be what you want to say has no overlap with what I say. You put
yourself in the corner if you try to dismiss results (that anybody
patient enough can verify) by staying at a vague meta-socio-logical
level.
I do have a feeling that you are a bit negative, together with a
feeling that you might not have understood what I have done. In a
sense what I have done is negative itself. You can see it as a remind
that we have not yet solved, nor really try to formulate, the mind-
body problem, and that the easily assumed one-one relation between
mind and body is not really sustainable when we assume consciousness
invariant for some transformation, (or even just QM). And there is
that testable consequence, which is that the physical laws get
themselves invariant for the choice of the universal base (in which we
define the computable functions phi_i, and can defined the
computations). This comes in part from the invariance of many
theoretical computer science truth, the so-called "machine
independent" results, which are true for all universal systems (like
the closure for the diagonal procedure, the non solvability of the
halting problem, the higher unsolvability of the "totalness" problem,
etc.
What is your opinion on physicalism? Are you able to doubt it?
I try hard to see the problem.
Oh, I see you continue:
and I'm not like this guy I hope, because I work at my own theory a
long time that involves 'computation', and 'nothingness' though
nothing like those words used here. But I'm not ready...and I don't
want to do a John Ross or Edgar Owen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkZdTHmX0TQ
and
and I'm not like this guy I hope, because I work at my own theory a
long time that involves 'computation', and 'nothingness' though
nothing like those words used here. But I'm not ready...and I don't
want to do a John Ross or Edgar Owen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkZdTHmX0TQ
but would have to hold me hands up to this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuM_iSwMof8
Lol.
Harry Enfield and Chums, Nice! :)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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