On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/13/2014 2:22 PM, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 13 June 2014 20:44, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> under >>>> physicalism, in accounting for the origin of matter (which is basic). >>>> This makes it coherent, at least in principle, to ask for an >>>> exhaustive physical accounting of any given state of affairs. In the >>>> final analysis *everything* must be reducible, by assumption, to one >>>> or another description of some basic set of underlying physical >>>> relations. >>>> >>>> Under computationalism, by contrast, the epistemological logic is >>>> absolutely central in differentiating the lawful appearances of matter >>>> from the exhaustive redundancy of the computational base. Hence on >>>> these assumptions, even in principle, no state of affairs above the >>>> level of the basic ontology could ever be exhaustively accounted for >>>> by any catalogue of descriptions, however sophisticated or >>>> multi-levelled, of its merely physical dispositions, absent the >>>> selective logic of its epistemology. >>>> >>> ?? Too dense for me. >>> >>> I think logic can be accounted for in 3p and can be observed in brains, >>> as >>> in computers. >>> >> I'm sorry if it's hard to follow my drift, but I'm also a little >> flummoxed that we're still flogging this particular horse. Why is such >> a fundamental distinction between physicalism and computationalism >> still so contentious after all the to-ing and fro-ing on this very >> point on this list over the years? We are not debating the correctness >> of either of the theories under discussion, but rather the >> distinctively different role that is played by their various >> conceptual elements. >> >> To summarise, then: physicalism is the hypothesis that an exhaustively >> reduced account of any state of affairs whatsoever can, in principle, >> be rendered by reference to a particular, restricted class of >> fundamental entities and relations. >> > > So those fundamental entities can be numbers and the relations can be > functions in arithmetic? > > It appears so, so far, from observation of how physical theories that work have been constructed.
E.g. Physical theory with words: "GOD DID IT" Physical theory with numbers and so on: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
