Is 666 not the "Apokalyps" number? JM
On Sat, Jun 14, 2014 at 10:42 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote: > *6 6 6 !!!!! Boo! * > > Actually, The numerical number of God reminds me of some of the writings > of Clifford Pickover, so sort of half-believes in his math magic. > > > I think I never had the perseverance to decipher such a long expression, > now I certainly don't. > Question: how much is the NUMERICAL NUMBER OF GOD? > John M > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: John Mikes <[email protected]> > To: everything-list <[email protected]> > Sent: Sat, Jun 14, 2014 10:37 am > Subject: Re: TRONNIES - SPACE > > Liz wrote: > E.G.: Physical theory with words: "GOD DID IT" - Physical theory with > numbers and so on: > > > I think I never had the perseverance to decipher such a long > expression, now I certainly don't. > Question: how much is the NUMERICAL NUMBER OF GOD? > John M > > > > On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 7:43 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 6/13/2014 2:22 PM, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 13 June 2014 20:44, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> under >>>>>> physicalism, in accounting for the origin of matter (which is basic). >>>>>> This makes it coherent, at least in principle, to ask for an >>>>>> exhaustive physical accounting of any given state of affairs. In the >>>>>> final analysis *everything* must be reducible, by assumption, to one >>>>>> or another description of some basic set of underlying physical >>>>>> relations. >>>>>> >>>>>> Under computationalism, by contrast, the epistemological logic is >>>>>> absolutely central in differentiating the lawful appearances of matter >>>>>> from the exhaustive redundancy of the computational base. Hence on >>>>>> these assumptions, even in principle, no state of affairs above the >>>>>> level of the basic ontology could ever be exhaustively accounted for >>>>>> by any catalogue of descriptions, however sophisticated or >>>>>> multi-levelled, of its merely physical dispositions, absent the >>>>>> selective logic of its epistemology. >>>>>> >>>>> ?? Too dense for me. >>>>> >>>>> I think logic can be accounted for in 3p and can be observed in >>>>> brains, as >>>>> in computers. >>>>> >>>> I'm sorry if it's hard to follow my drift, but I'm also a little >>>> flummoxed that we're still flogging this particular horse. Why is such >>>> a fundamental distinction between physicalism and computationalism >>>> still so contentious after all the to-ing and fro-ing on this very >>>> point on this list over the years? We are not debating the correctness >>>> of either of the theories under discussion, but rather the >>>> distinctively different role that is played by their various >>>> conceptual elements. >>>> >>>> To summarise, then: physicalism is the hypothesis that an exhaustively >>>> reduced account of any state of affairs whatsoever can, in principle, >>>> be rendered by reference to a particular, restricted class of >>>> fundamental entities and relations. >>>> >>> >>> So those fundamental entities can be numbers and the relations can be >>> functions in arithmetic? >>> >>> It appears so, so far, from observation of how physical theories that >> work have been constructed. >> >> E.g. >> >> Physical theory with words: "GOD DID IT" >> >> Physical theory with numbers and so on: >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
