Liz wrote:
E.G.: Physical theory with words: "GOD DID IT" - Physical theory with
numbers and so on:


I think I never had the perseverance to decipher such a long expression,
now I certainly don't.
Question: how much is the NUMERICAL NUMBER OF GOD?
John M



On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 7:43 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> On 6/13/2014 2:22 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 13 June 2014 20:44, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> under
>>>>> physicalism, in accounting for the origin of matter (which is basic).
>>>>> This makes it coherent, at least in principle, to ask for an
>>>>> exhaustive physical accounting of any given state of affairs. In the
>>>>> final analysis *everything* must be reducible, by assumption, to one
>>>>> or another description of some basic set of underlying physical
>>>>> relations.
>>>>>
>>>>> Under computationalism, by contrast, the epistemological logic is
>>>>> absolutely central in differentiating the lawful appearances of matter
>>>>> from the exhaustive redundancy of the computational base. Hence on
>>>>> these assumptions, even in principle, no state of affairs above the
>>>>> level of the basic ontology could ever be exhaustively accounted for
>>>>> by any catalogue of descriptions, however sophisticated or
>>>>> multi-levelled, of its merely physical dispositions, absent the
>>>>> selective logic of its epistemology.
>>>>>
>>>> ?? Too dense for me.
>>>>
>>>> I think logic can be accounted for in 3p and can be observed in brains,
>>>> as
>>>> in computers.
>>>>
>>> I'm sorry if it's hard to follow my drift, but I'm also a little
>>> flummoxed that we're still flogging this particular horse. Why is such
>>> a fundamental distinction between physicalism and computationalism
>>> still so contentious after all the to-ing and fro-ing on this very
>>> point on this list over the years? We are not debating the correctness
>>> of either of the theories under discussion, but rather the
>>> distinctively different role that is played by their various
>>> conceptual elements.
>>>
>>> To summarise, then: physicalism is the hypothesis that an exhaustively
>>> reduced account of any state of affairs whatsoever can, in principle,
>>> be rendered by reference to a particular, restricted class of
>>> fundamental entities and relations.
>>>
>>
>> So those fundamental entities can be numbers and the relations can be
>> functions in arithmetic?
>>
>> It appears so, so far, from observation of how physical theories that
> work have been constructed.
>
> E.g.
>
> Physical theory with words: "GOD DID IT"
>
> Physical theory with numbers and so on:
>
>
> ​
>
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