On 16 Jun 2014, at 02:01, LizR wrote:
On 16 June 2014 11:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/15/2014 3:03 PM, LizR wrote:
And it depends a lot on what you think about mathematics; whether
it's just a precise and and strictly logical subset of language or
whether it's really real ur-stuff.
Yes, that's one way to rephrase what I just said. My only addition
is that if you think the former, then you should explain why it
works so well.
I should think that's obvious. What "works to well" was invented by
us to describe the world as *we* experience it.
I don't buy that solipsistic stuff. I'm fairly sure the science
we've "invented" could have been discovered by anyone in the universe.
Notice we keep having to invent new mathematics as our instruments
and observations get better.
You keep trying to slip in "invented" as though we aren't
discovering how the world works. But we are, as having it kick back
in thousands of ways (computers work, aeroplanes work, antibiotics
work, rockets to the Moon work...) has shown.
Did Plato include non-commutative geometry or transfinite cardinals
among his perfect forms?
Was there some point to that sentence? Looks like a hand waving
attempt to discredit Platonism tout court. We're not supposed to be
here to play silly rhetorical games (and you didn't even specify the
"I'm being a politician" hat). So Plato didn't predict future maths,
whoopy-do.
You are right. Aristotle didn't predict future math too, nor future
physics.
The question is only which theory explains better the facts, without
eliminating person and consciousness.
There are huge parts of mathematics which seem to do no work
whatsoever. Just look at https://oeis.org/ (try entering "liz"), a
favorite of a mathematician friend of mine. I'd say that's a mark
against Platonism; yet it's just what you'd expect if they are just
extensions of a logical language game.
What you wouldn't expect if they are "just extensions of a logical
language game" is for someone to invent maths that turns out to have
physical applications centuries later. Yes that's happened several
times.
Even Einstein eventually understood that there is a possibilly non
trivial and fundamental mathematical reality.
The doctrine that math is only a language is called "conventionalism".
It is debunked by elementary arithmetic and elementary computer science.
Meanwhile, maths with no application is exactly what you'd expect if
the MUH is true. Not saying this is evidence for the MUH, but at
least it's consistent with it. But not with "we're making up science
as a logical language game / cultural construct" stuff.
I can understand "mathematical theory", or "mathematical structure" or
"mathematical truth", but "mathematical universe" is quite fuzzy for
me. (But then I am a mathematician, and I am aware of the failure of
all serious attempt to get a unifying theory. This does not mean there
is no big interest of what mathematicians found when searching for
such mathematics, which go from arithmetic itself to category theory,
n-category theory, toposes.
Assuming comp adding anything to the natural numbers is misleading at
the ontological level. The numbers themselves will add the axioms
needed in their relative histories.
I'm open to suggestions, of course, but so far Tegmark's MUH seems
to be the only one I've heard that seems to have any philosophical
teeth.
How about some empirical teeth.
Having any type of teeth puts it ahead of the competition.
When I said I'm open to suggestions I meant ones which at least fit
in with our current state of knowledge, not appeals to ideas that
we're inventing science as a language game, or rhetorical tricks
about Plato not inventing calculus. You're better than this, Brent,
I actually feel rather insulted by the level of response you've
given me this time.
You should not. take it easy. Brent might have got a cold or
something. He seems indeed usually more convincing.
Bruno
Do you really think I'm so stupid that I can just be fobbed off with
postmodernist nonsense, rather than some decent arguments?
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