On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 12:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/19/2013 1:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:36 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Here is my tuppence about the *hoax-game* of the *fantasy-play* >> 'teleportation': >> It is what I said, never substantiated and placed into circumstances >> never substantiated or verified even within our imaginary physical(?) >> explanations. >> Wana play? be my guest. >> In a 'transportation' (cf: reincarnation-like?) one is supposed to >> receive new identity as fitting for the new circumstances, with memory >> arased of the old one. >> YOU2 is NOT YOU1. (Not even YOU1*). >> > > If you don't accept in step 1 then computationalism is false (which is > possible, but it was an explicit assumption on which the rest of the > reasoning is based). > > Why should we think computationalism is true? Our particles are > substituted all the time through normal metabolism, so the particular parts > are not important so long as the pattern is preserved. Further, no known > laws of physics are incomputable, so then the brain must use some, as of > yet, undiscovered physics in order to assert computationalism is false. > > > I don't think it's that simple. Obviously if you substitute atom-for-atom > it will be successful because (according to our best theories) atom are > indistinguishable. But suppose you try to substitute a silicon chip > implant for some part of the brain with identical, functional i/o at all > the neuron interfaces it replaced. Would it preserve your consciousness? > I think it would approximately; but there are possible differences. It > wouldn't react the same to EM fields, cosmic rays, potassium radioactive in > the blood,... So it might be a little different. Second, it would have the > plasticity of neurons, the ability to grow and shrink and change in > response to 'learning', i.e. interaction with other parts. > If you assume zombies are not possible, then I think my original statement holds. Without assuming uncomputable physics plays a necessary role in the brain, then computationalism is true. If you believe that consciousness is supported by the brain, and that the brain is made of atoms, and that atoms obey laws of physics, and that those laws are computable, then it is possible in theory for a program to perfectly emulate the behavior and evolution of a brain. Now whether or not this emulation is consciousness or not is not proved, unless you further assume zombies are impossible. If they are not possible, then you must attribute consciousness to this perfect brain emulation. > > Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but the > point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for interaction > with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction with 'external' > or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then we must > contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but simulating some > of the external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff. > This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way galaxy. Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of physics are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes some FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess things up. > If we want to preserve consciousness unaffected just by replacements in > the brain, those replacements will need to be at a very low level. So low > that the quantum non-cloning theorem comes into play and it can't be done > except by chance. On the other hand we can do a substitution that is > behaviorally so similar that the difference will be unnoticable even by > close friends, but which maybe different at the incommunicable > consciousness level. Or a third "possibility" is that we can simulate the > consciousness AND it's interaction with the world so that both the internal > functions, plasticity, and external affects are preserve. But then the > penalty is effectively creating another world - which is what Everettian > splitting does. > > So in effect the non-cloning theorem prevents saying "yes" to the doctor > if you insist on there being no discontinuity in your consciousness. The > Moscow man and the Washington man will be in different quantum states even > before they step out of the teleporter and see what city they are in. Of > course in practice we're not particularly concerned with small gaps in > consciousness. None of this implies some undiscovered physics. > > The question of gaps is interesting, especially when when we consider simulating physical objects as computations can be smeared out across space-time, and may not be perfectly captured in any particular instant (space-time slice). 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