On 26 June 2014 15:44, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/25/2014 8:38 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 26 June 2014 15:25, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/25/2014 6:47 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but >>>> the point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for >>>> interaction with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction >>>> with 'external' or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then >>>> we must contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but >>>> simulating some of the external world. So it seems to me there is a >>>> tradeoff. >>>> >>> >>> This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way >>> galaxy. Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of >>> physics are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes >>> some FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess >>> things up. >>> >>> Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you have >>> to simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then >>> all you've shown is that a *simulated *consciousness can exist in a * >>> simulated *world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate. >>> >> >> Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an *actual* >> consciousness can exist in a simulated world. >> >> Sure, that's already implicit in assuming consciousness is produced by >> certain computational processes. >> > > Yes, so there was no need to say "simulated" above. It looked as though > you were trying to make a distinction when there isn't one. > > There's not a distinction that makes one consciousness different from the > other, except that one is conscious of the simulated world and one is > conscious of this world. >
And if the simulation is good enough they have identical experiences, so - no different at all. In fact it's hard to believe that consciousness is something that can be "simulated", regardless of how its achieved I imagine it's always actual, by definition, whether it's experiencing a simulated world or a real one (which is also a simulation, at least in our case, as I believe Kant pointed out). > I take Bruno (and Maudlin) to be arguing that there need not be any > physical process to instantiate consciousness - and that is what I find > unconvincing. > I realise that you find it unconvincing, of course, and I am still hopeful that you will come up with a convincing reason why, i.e. one that doesn't just say "I just don't see how X can be true". (Or that Bruno will come up with a convincing reason why not. (Or maybe I'll just remain agnostic indefinitely, which is probably best...)) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
