On 26 June 2014 15:44, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 6/25/2014 8:38 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 26 June 2014 15:25, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>   On 6/25/2014 6:47 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>  On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>  Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but
>>>> the point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for
>>>> interaction with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction
>>>> with 'external' or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions.  Then
>>>> we must contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but
>>>> simulating some of the external world.  So it seems to me there is a
>>>> tradeoff.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way
>>> galaxy. Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of
>>> physics are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes
>>> some FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess
>>> things up.
>>>
>>>  Exactly.  But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing.  If you have
>>> to simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then
>>> all you've shown is that a *simulated *consciousness can exist in a *
>>> simulated *world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate.
>>>
>>
>>  Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an *actual*
>> consciousness can exist in a simulated world.
>>
>>  Sure, that's already implicit in assuming consciousness is produced by
>> certain computational processes.
>>
>
>  Yes, so there was no need to say "simulated" above. It looked as though
> you were trying to make a distinction when there isn't one.
>
>  There's not a distinction that makes one consciousness different from the
> other, except that one is conscious of the simulated world and one is
> conscious of this world.
>

And if the simulation is good enough they have identical experiences, so -
no different at all. In fact it's hard to believe that consciousness is
something that can be "simulated", regardless of how its achieved I imagine
it's always actual, by definition, whether it's experiencing a simulated
world or a real one (which is also a simulation, at least in our case, as I
believe Kant pointed out).


> I take Bruno (and Maudlin) to be arguing that there need not be any
> physical process to instantiate consciousness - and that is what I find
> unconvincing.
>

I realise that you find it unconvincing, of course, and I am still hopeful
that you will come up with a convincing reason why, i.e. one that doesn't
just say "I just don't see how X can be true". (Or that Bruno will come up
with a convincing reason why not. (Or maybe I'll just remain agnostic
indefinitely, which is probably best...))

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