On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but the >> point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for interaction >> with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction with 'external' >> or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then we must >> contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but simulating some >> of the external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff. >> > > This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way galaxy. > Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of physics > are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes some > FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess things > up. > > Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you have to > simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then > all you've shown is that a simulated consciousness can exist in a simulated > world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate. >
Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an *actual* consciousness can exist in a simulated world. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
