On 26 June 2014 15:25, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/25/2014 6:47 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but >>> the point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for >>> interaction with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction >>> with 'external' or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then >>> we must contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but >>> simulating some of the external world. So it seems to me there is a >>> tradeoff. >>> >> >> This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way galaxy. >> Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of physics >> are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes some >> FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess things >> up. >> >> Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you have >> to simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then >> all you've shown is that a *simulated *consciousness can exist in a * >> simulated *world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate. >> > > Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an *actual* > consciousness can exist in a simulated world. > > Sure, that's already implicit in assuming consciousness is produced by > certain computational processes. >
Yes, so there was no need to say "simulated" above. It looked as though you were trying to make a distinction when there isn't one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
