On 01 Jul 2014, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/1/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But you don't have to prove something doesn't exist to reasonably
fail to believe that it does. I don't have proof that there is no
teapot orbiting Jupiter, but that doesn't make me epitemologically
irresponsible to assert I don't believe there is one.
Careful as "I don't believe there is a teapot" is different from "I
believe there is no teapot".
Personally, I don't believe that there is teapot orbiting Jupiter,
but why would I believe that there is no teapot? I have no real
evidences for that too. I have only a speculation extrapolated from
my limited knowledge of teapot and Jupiter.
I might *bet* that there is no teapot, but then I can easily
conceive losing the bet, by the usual "bad luck".
How you would bet and at what odds is the real measure of belief. I
think you believe there is no teapot.
I think that the presence of such teapot is highly implausible. But I
can't be sure.
But the god notion of the neoplatonist makes sense with comp, and it
allows us to study canonical number theology (G*, Z*, X*, G1*,Z1*, X1*)
I prefer to use "God" for reality (or semantics, truth conditions),
because if I use "reality", I have to first explain that science has
not yet decide if reality is material and immaterial.
To study the mind body problem, it is preferable to not start from a
theology (like *assuming* in the theory that "there is a physical
universe"). Of course it exists in the meta-theory, but we can decide
to note define its status before proceeding.
Machine's theology is really just computer science, with some emphasis
on the difference between computer science and computer's computer
science (G* \ G, X* \ X, etc.).
Bruno
Brent
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