On 03 Jul 2014, at 18:39, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 July 2014 14:22, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
And perhaps most interestingly,
its central motivation originates in, and simultaneously strikes at
the heart of, the tacit assumption of its rivals that perception and
cognition are (somehow) second-order relational phenomena attached to
some putative "virtual level" of an exhaustively "material"
reduction.
The problem of the exhaustively material reduction is that it does
use comp,
more or less explicitly, without being aware that it does not work
when put
together with with materialism.
Yes, and I was roused from my customary torpor specifically to have
another stab at a thoroughgoing reductio of this position (or else, of
course, learn where I am in error). But, frustratingly, it does seem
to be extraordinarily hard to get across for the first time, because
of the tacit question-begging almost unavoidably consequent on the
difficulty of vacating the very perceptual position whose all too
manifest "entities" are undergoing ontological deconstruction. Once
seen, however, the error may then strike one as having been obvious.
The commonest response, in my experience, after describing the
mind-body problem to someone for the first time, is "I don't see the
problem". On further probing, the default assumptions usually turn out
to be either straightforward mind-brain "identity", or "mind =
simulation, brain = computer". If the former, I point, in the first
place, to the completely non-standard and unjustified use of the
identity relation that this entails. If the latter, simple reductive
analogies like house-bricks, or society-people, can sometimes help to
convey the idea that any exhaustively reductive material schema
necessarily *eliminates* its ontological composites (difficult to see
precisely because *epistemological* composition manifestly remains and
the distinction is thereby elusive). Anyway, if the point is grasped
it becomes possible to see the disturbing consequences that such a
reduction has for the standard conjunction of "material computation"
and consciousness.
I think so. Both the MGA and UDA1-7 were developed with the goal to
explain a *part* of the mind-body problem in a way such a rationalist
can say "OK, I see a problem".
That worked well, but I did not expect *some* scientists ("diplomed
such") would ask a Romane-philosopher (branch of literature) to say "I
am not convinced", justifying a non-dialog, not even a debate.
It is not the whole problem. It is the fact that if we believe in
consciousness, and if we believe that the brain works like a digital
machine, eventually, with or without a primitively existing physical
universe, we have to justify the appearances of matter entirely from
computer science, indeed from arithmetic (or any Turing-complete
theory).
As such, the hard problem of consciousness is not yet approached, nor
used. Even if we eliminate consciousness, matter must be explain from
a statistics on machine's discourses.
At that point, the mind-body problem is only shown two times more
difficult than usual, as we have both the hard problem of
consciousness together with a new, conceptually less hard but
technically very hard, problem of matter.
Now animals are programmed to take matter for granted, as it is easier
to eat and avoid being eaten. that's why I think "modern science" is
really born with the platonists, which is notably the idea that what
we see might result from simpler general relation, and that may be we
might find first principles.
Now, computer science provides the tools, and in some sense, offers
the solution of the "hard problem" of consciousness on a plate.
Indeed, it provides the non trivial mathematics of what ideally
correct machine can prove, bet, infer, conceive, measure, observe
know, believe about themselves. Accepting definitions on those, in the
Arithmetical FPI contexts, and translating the definition in
arithmetic by constraints which *all* makes sense due to the real
bomb: Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and the fact that
(Löbian) machines proves their own incompleteness theorem.
Then the solution of the hard problem is given by a disambiguation
between []p (the 3p virtual body or its "Gödel number", or its "Gödel
biochemical relation" that's not important) with []p & p, which is the
knower, the first person, the soul if you want, and which is NOT a
machine, and no machines can correctly justify a "[]" such that []p <-
> []p & p, despite we, the theoricians on correct machine, know that
their G* proves it.
To bet that we are machine, in the "yes doctor" quasi operational
sense, means that we bet on some identification between []p and []p &
p at some level (defining the "[]"), but only "a God" (here the
arithmetical Noùs G* of that "[]p") can know that "[]" are correct (in
case it is correct).
Universal machine with tape long enough to comfortably look inward for
a time can't miss the consciousness problem, the matter appearance
problem and its classical resolution.
Does comp by itself solves the problem? I think it is technically
promising,
if we agree with the "ancient epistemology". It provides directly
the
needed quantization to get a stable measure on the relative
computational
histories, and it separates well the quanta from the qualia, or more
generally the 3p communicable, the 3p non communicable, the 1p, etc.
Physics predicts very well eclipses, but still fail completely to
predict
the first person experience of the subject verifying the predicted
eclipse.
To do this, they need to use some brain-mind identity thesis, which
is
violated with comp, and arguably also with Everett QM.
I don't think that most physicists (there are exceptions) have taken
the problem of consciousness seriously (i.e. as a problem in physics)
up to this point, hence my speculation that certain kinds of answer
are ruled out (or rendered either absurd or trivial) by posing the
defining questions of a field in one way rather than another. As you
say, comp is a theory of consciousness, so its "question" is that of
explaining material appearances from the point of view of a
generalised (arithmetical) theory of knowledge.
Yes. That can be escaped by reifying a 'magical' primitive matter,
which still remains testable with respect to accepting the usual semi-
axiomatic of known, belief, etc.
So I think there is indeed no choice in the matter (pun included).
By contrast, physics
is explicitly NOT a theory of consciousness and, should it consider
the question at all, must expect "material appearances" to be
explained in the same terms as any other "physical" phenomenon (e.g.
Tegmark's recent idea that consciousness is a state of matter).
This illustrates that Tegmark has not yet understand the impact of
comp, or of any of its reasonably constructive weakening. Despite its
mathematicalism, he continue to use physics for consciousness, when
we can already derive a lot assume comp. His state of matter theory
does not obviously violate comp, put would put the level a priori in
the very low. But by doing physics here, he still evacuate under the
usual aristotelian rug the mind-body problem. He missed that such a
problem is a metamathematical, and mathematical, even arithmetical
problem.
For me at least, the ways in which the mind-body problem has been
approached against the background of physical-primitivism have the
feel of being "not even wrong" or, at least, of being attempts to
"answer" a badly-posed question.
OK.
Brent's alternative speculation that
the "problem" itself will fade away in the face of superior
engineering, whilst (unfortunately) all too sociologically plausible,
consequently strikes me as a willingness to capitulate to outright
mysterianism, or else tacit eliminativism.
Well, mysterianism is better than eliminativism, and closer to the
truth for the self-referentially correct machine, as indeed no "[]"
can identify its []p and []p & p. Somehow they live in different
"space"/"reality".
Such intractable
"mysteries" or equally, the tacit elimination of troublesome
"problems", are perhaps defining hallmarks of an explanatory strategy
operating outside its limits of applicability.
I think so.
Some makes into dogma what was only fertile methodological
simplifications.
Unfortunately this
insight seems to strike some as a form of heresy against physics,
rather than an observation about explanation in general.
It is only heresy against physicalism.
Computationalism does not threat physics more than physics threat
alpinism.
But the Aristotelian conception of science and religion can be
considered as questioned, indeed.
I agree comp rehabilitates "old thinking", but sometimes the
"mechanist"
assumption (unaware of Church thesis and digitalness) was already
there.
Well, a form of digitalism (still without Church thesis) was arguably
present in Pythagorus and reappear with the neoplatonists
(unfortunately not
all neoplatonist will be as serious on this as Plotinus).
For this thread I want to insist on the little book by Gerson
"Ancient
Epistemology".
I'll take a look :-)
Note that I disagree with some point, and its use of the term
"naturalism" is bit misleading. But you can see that the greeks
already discussed this very thread :) It sums well the thread from
Plato to the neoplatonists. He is of course not aware that the
universal machine comes at the rescue to refute Socrates critics
against his []p & p definition of knowledge.
Bruno
David
On 01 Jul 2014, at 14:00, David Nyman wrote:
Whatever its independent merits or demerits, and its inherent
complexity, ISTM that comp gets closer to a way of posing questions
that might in the end yield more satisfying and complete answers. As
it happens, in so doing it rehabilitates earlier attempts in the
tradition stemming from the Greeks and Indians, and from later
exemplars such as Berkeley and Kant. And perhaps most interestingly,
its central motivation originates in, and simultaneously strikes at
the heart of, the tacit assumption of its rivals that perception and
cognition are (somehow) second-order relational phenomena attached to
some putative "virtual level" of an exhaustively "material"
reduction.
The problem of the exhaustively material reduction is that it does
use comp,
more or less explicitly, without being aware that it does not work
when put
together with with materialism.
Comp *is* a problem for the materialist. Aristotle "solved" it by
introducing the metaphysical notion of "primary matter", which
might perhaps
(that's not yet proved either) make sense with some strong special
non-comp
hypothesis, but up to now the materialist fail to provide the
theory. And
that is "so true" that rational materialist ends up eliminating
consciousness and/or first person.
Does comp by itself solves the problem? I think it is technically
promising,
if we agree with the "ancient epistemology". It provides directly
the
needed quantization to get a stable measure on the relative
computational
histories, and it separates well the quanta from the qualia, or more
generally the 3p communicable, the 3p non communicable, the 1p, etc.
Physics predicts very well eclipses, but still fail completely to
predict
the first person experience of the subject verifying the predicted
eclipse.
To do this, they need to use some brain-mind identity thesis, which
is
violated with comp, and arguably also with Everett QM.
We could argue that comp is the only rational theory not (yet)
contradicted
by the fact, including our consciousness or first person experiences.
Materialism is put in difficulty with the usual evidences (coming
from
biology, or from simplicity principle, + consciousness) for comp.
I agree comp rehabilitates "old thinking", but sometimes the
"mechanist"
assumption (unaware of Church thesis and digitalness) was already
there.
Well, a form of digitalism (still without Church thesis) was arguably
present in Pythagorus and reappear with the neoplatonists
(unfortunately not
all neoplatonist will be as serious on this as Plotinus).
For this thread I want to insist on the little book by Gerson
"Ancient
Epistemology".
http://www.amazon.com/Ancient-Epistemology-Key-Themes-Philosophy/dp/0521871395
Using the Plotinus/arithmetic lexicon, you can clarify many points
(and
refute some of Gerson's conclusion).
The books by O'Meara on Plotinus, and Myles Burnyeat on the
Theaetetus are
quite interesting too.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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