On 3 July 2014 14:22, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > And perhaps most interestingly, > its central motivation originates in, and simultaneously strikes at > the heart of, the tacit assumption of its rivals that perception and > cognition are (somehow) second-order relational phenomena attached to > some putative "virtual level" of an exhaustively "material" reduction. > > The problem of the exhaustively material reduction is that it does use comp, > more or less explicitly, without being aware that it does not work when put > together with with materialism.
Yes, and I was roused from my customary torpor specifically to have another stab at a thoroughgoing reductio of this position (or else, of course, learn where I am in error). But, frustratingly, it does seem to be extraordinarily hard to get across for the first time, because of the tacit question-begging almost unavoidably consequent on the difficulty of vacating the very perceptual position whose all too manifest "entities" are undergoing ontological deconstruction. Once seen, however, the error may then strike one as having been obvious. The commonest response, in my experience, after describing the mind-body problem to someone for the first time, is "I don't see the problem". On further probing, the default assumptions usually turn out to be either straightforward mind-brain "identity", or "mind = simulation, brain = computer". If the former, I point, in the first place, to the completely non-standard and unjustified use of the identity relation that this entails. If the latter, simple reductive analogies like house-bricks, or society-people, can sometimes help to convey the idea that any exhaustively reductive material schema necessarily *eliminates* its ontological composites (difficult to see precisely because *epistemological* composition manifestly remains and the distinction is thereby elusive). Anyway, if the point is grasped it becomes possible to see the disturbing consequences that such a reduction has for the standard conjunction of "material computation" and consciousness. > Does comp by itself solves the problem? I think it is technically promising, > if we agree with the "ancient epistemology". It provides directly the > needed quantization to get a stable measure on the relative computational > histories, and it separates well the quanta from the qualia, or more > generally the 3p communicable, the 3p non communicable, the 1p, etc. > > Physics predicts very well eclipses, but still fail completely to predict > the first person experience of the subject verifying the predicted eclipse. > To do this, they need to use some brain-mind identity thesis, which is > violated with comp, and arguably also with Everett QM. I don't think that most physicists (there are exceptions) have taken the problem of consciousness seriously (i.e. as a problem in physics) up to this point, hence my speculation that certain kinds of answer are ruled out (or rendered either absurd or trivial) by posing the defining questions of a field in one way rather than another. As you say, comp is a theory of consciousness, so its "question" is that of explaining material appearances from the point of view of a generalised (arithmetical) theory of knowledge. By contrast, physics is explicitly NOT a theory of consciousness and, should it consider the question at all, must expect "material appearances" to be explained in the same terms as any other "physical" phenomenon (e.g. Tegmark's recent idea that consciousness is a state of matter). For me at least, the ways in which the mind-body problem has been approached against the background of physical-primitivism have the feel of being "not even wrong" or, at least, of being attempts to "answer" a badly-posed question. Brent's alternative speculation that the "problem" itself will fade away in the face of superior engineering, whilst (unfortunately) all too sociologically plausible, consequently strikes me as a willingness to capitulate to outright mysterianism, or else tacit eliminativism. Such intractable "mysteries" or equally, the tacit elimination of troublesome "problems", are perhaps defining hallmarks of an explanatory strategy operating outside its limits of applicability. Unfortunately this insight seems to strike some as a form of heresy against physics, rather than an observation about explanation in general. > I agree comp rehabilitates "old thinking", but sometimes the "mechanist" > assumption (unaware of Church thesis and digitalness) was already there. > Well, a form of digitalism (still without Church thesis) was arguably > present in Pythagorus and reappear with the neoplatonists (unfortunately not > all neoplatonist will be as serious on this as Plotinus). > > For this thread I want to insist on the little book by Gerson "Ancient > Epistemology". I'll take a look :-) David > > On 01 Jul 2014, at 14:00, David Nyman wrote: > > Whatever its independent merits or demerits, and its inherent > complexity, ISTM that comp gets closer to a way of posing questions > that might in the end yield more satisfying and complete answers. As > it happens, in so doing it rehabilitates earlier attempts in the > tradition stemming from the Greeks and Indians, and from later > exemplars such as Berkeley and Kant. And perhaps most interestingly, > its central motivation originates in, and simultaneously strikes at > the heart of, the tacit assumption of its rivals that perception and > cognition are (somehow) second-order relational phenomena attached to > some putative "virtual level" of an exhaustively "material" reduction. > > > > The problem of the exhaustively material reduction is that it does use comp, > more or less explicitly, without being aware that it does not work when put > together with with materialism. > > Comp *is* a problem for the materialist. Aristotle "solved" it by > introducing the metaphysical notion of "primary matter", which might perhaps > (that's not yet proved either) make sense with some strong special non-comp > hypothesis, but up to now the materialist fail to provide the theory. And > that is "so true" that rational materialist ends up eliminating > consciousness and/or first person. > > Does comp by itself solves the problem? I think it is technically promising, > if we agree with the "ancient epistemology". It provides directly the > needed quantization to get a stable measure on the relative computational > histories, and it separates well the quanta from the qualia, or more > generally the 3p communicable, the 3p non communicable, the 1p, etc. > > Physics predicts very well eclipses, but still fail completely to predict > the first person experience of the subject verifying the predicted eclipse. > To do this, they need to use some brain-mind identity thesis, which is > violated with comp, and arguably also with Everett QM. > > We could argue that comp is the only rational theory not (yet) contradicted > by the fact, including our consciousness or first person experiences. > Materialism is put in difficulty with the usual evidences (coming from > biology, or from simplicity principle, + consciousness) for comp. > > I agree comp rehabilitates "old thinking", but sometimes the "mechanist" > assumption (unaware of Church thesis and digitalness) was already there. > Well, a form of digitalism (still without Church thesis) was arguably > present in Pythagorus and reappear with the neoplatonists (unfortunately not > all neoplatonist will be as serious on this as Plotinus). > > For this thread I want to insist on the little book by Gerson "Ancient > Epistemology". > > http://www.amazon.com/Ancient-Epistemology-Key-Themes-Philosophy/dp/0521871395 > > Using the Plotinus/arithmetic lexicon, you can clarify many points (and > refute some of Gerson's conclusion). > > The books by O'Meara on Plotinus, and Myles Burnyeat on the Theaetetus are > quite interesting too. > > > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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