On 4 July 2014 22:36, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> Do you wish to say that >> mountains have *ontological* significance *in addition* to the rocks >> that comprise them? > > Yes. There could be rocks without there being mountains.
If rocks and their relations are primitive in this analogy, what is the independent *ontological* relevance of a mountain *in addition* to the rocks that comprise it? What, given ideal knowledge of the disposition of rocks, would I fail to account for in terms of their further evolution? >> We accept of course that they exist >> *epistemologically* (i.e. as objects of knowledge from the point of >> view of a knower), but we can't adduce that fact, a posteriori, in >> support of their having any *ontological* purchase independent of >> their components. > > Can you define "ontological purchase"? I'm merely reiterating that they lack further ontological significance in addition to that of their ontological primitives. Please understand that this isn't an attempt on my part to impose my ideas on "reality". I'm only speaking in terms of the requirements of a theory; and whatever a reductive theory takes to be its primitive ontology exhausts *by definition* what is ontologically relevant *in terms of that theory*. The alternative, I presume, is some form of strong ontological emergence - i.e. the idea that, at some higher level of organisation, completely novel features, not reducible to the basement-level ontology, must be taken into account. >> What then is "physical computation" in this schema? It can only be a >> second-order relational concept involving what are already composites >> of the physical primitives in which such putative relata are grounded. >> Hence, a fortiori, it can have no claim to independent ontological >> (i.e. "physical") significance. > > Why not. I think you're relying on loaded language like "second-order" to > imply your conclusion. Why are "second order" relations not real? What are > "first order" relations? By first-order relations I just mean those defined in the ontology of the theory. Ex hypothesi, they are assumed to do all the theoretical work of transitioning from one state to another. Hence, in terms of the ontology, it can be assumed that whenever we speak of "higher levels" of organisation (e.g. mountains rather than rocks) we are making use of a "manner of speaking". IOW we have moved from ontology proper to epistemology, since the "higher level" has no independent ontological relevance. It is assumed to be an aggregation of first-order relations (e.g. a mountain is just rocks in relation). By second-order relations, I mean relations that are not simply hierarchical-reductive (such as mountains and rocks). Secondary relations such as those of computation can be *attributed* to all manner of physical systems which are transitioning from state to state at the level of first-order relations. Hence, they too lack independent ontological significance; they too are epistemological constructs, albeit at one level removed from the reductive hierarchy, as it were. Note again that I'm not trying to rule on what is "real". I'm wielding Occam's razor at the theoretical level. It's just *not necessary* (in fact it's disallowed) to attribute ontological relevance to anything above the basement in a reductive theory; that's the whole point of the reductive strategy. Of course, we don't emphasise this distinction in ordinary talk, or even in most scientific discourse, because in purely 3p terms it is largely without consequence. But this ceases to be the case when we propose a second-order relation like computation as the "physical correlate" of consciousness, precisely because it vitiates the idea that such relations can be anything other than a manner of speaking, in terms of the *ontology* of a reductive physical theory. Hence, to attribute the ability to evoke conscious states to such imaginary or virtual relations would seem to invoke a sort of ontological magic. >> It merely degenerates to the >> self-sufficient micro-evolution of some aggregation of physical >> primitives; whatever is not entirely "micro-physical" is a further >> attribution *from the perspective of some implicit theory of >> knowledge*. To put it baldly, computation, in terms of any theory >> grounded in physically-primitive relations, isn't a "further physical >> fact"; it just *looks* as if it is. Consequently it can hardly be a >> viable candidate for a "physical correlate" of consciousness, since >> such correlation can be defined only in terms of what is to be >> explained. > > But you can say exactly the same about numbers and arithmetical relations, > or for that matter souls and spirits. What do you mean, "but"? You seem to be arguing both ends here. You can't consistently reject my argument on the one hand, whilst at the same time use it as a weapon against alternative ontologies. Anyway, since I'm not an apologist for souls and spirits, I won't comment. But I've already said several times why I don't believe the argument holds in the case of numbers and arithmetical relations, at least in the way Bruno deploys them. Arithmetic, in the first instance, is simply posited as the minimal ontological assumption for the construction of an explicit epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers); IOW what physics explicitly eschews at the outset. From that point the explanatory thrust hinges on epistemological considerations and hence can no longer be straightforwardly reduced to the first-order ontology. > It seems to me you have taken > consciousness to be fundamental - except where you choose not to. I have never said anything of the sort. And, by the way, I'm not a "believer" in comp, I'm just trying to understand how it works. So my understanding is that consciousness is modelled in comp as coterminous, in some special sense, with truth. I tried to give an example of that in terms of "visual belief" and its corresponding truth content: what I see. If you like, the incommunicable 1p part of consciousness is what makes the 3p part true. That's another reason for disbelieving in zombies: if a system embodies the appropriate "belief" then the corresponding truth has a constitutive relation with it. IOW, truth in this sense isn't an optional extra. I think this is a neat idea; it seems to capture at least something right about the "mystery" of the first-person and I'd like to see where else it might lead. > Either > consciousness can be explained in terms of something that is not > consciousness or it's fundamental. Sure, and as I've said I think that the relations I've (inadequately) outlined above may lead to more fruitful explanations than consciousness-as-physical-reduction. > To a large degree this depends on what > you mean by "explain". I think being able to engineer intelligent, > conscious-like behavior is a good empirical standard of "explain". Well, I certainly used to believe that the best way of explaining a program was to write it. > What > would you count as an explanation? I think in the case of consciousness, explanation as opposed to engineering has to take foundational questions of knowledge and reference as seriously as those of physical phenomenology. And I also think comp at least provides a possible model of how progress could be made in this direction. On the one hand, it's all very well to say "Look, I just made something that is conscious" (though of course I would hardly sniff at that achievement!). But we might be able to do that just by using our engineering ingenuity to "copy Nature". I don't think it's meaningless or impossible to ask for more. > Whenever I consider a question I ask myself what would an answer look like? Me too. And I think that comp, even in its present nascent stage of development, can already give the lie to any suggestion that we have no idea what such an answer could look like. David > On 7/4/2014 2:05 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 4 July 2014 19:21, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>>>> If the latter, simple reductive >>>>> analogies like house-bricks, or society-people, can sometimes help to >>>>> convey the idea that any exhaustively reductive material schema >>>>> necessarily *eliminates* its ontological composites >>> >>> That's just your definition of eliminates. Mountains are made of rocks, >>> therefore mountains don't exist. >> >> I can't help feeling that you're leaning rather too heavily on "just" >> here. A contradiction is not an argument (at least according to Monty >> Python). However, you've said nothing so far to make me relinquish >> this definition, in the *ontological* sense. For some reason you >> ignore the distinction I've repeatedly drawn between the ontological >> and epistemological aspects of a theory. Do you wish to say that >> mountains have *ontological* significance *in addition* to the rocks >> that comprise them? > > > Yes. There could be rocks without there being mountains. > > >> We accept of course that they exist >> *epistemologically* (i.e. as objects of knowledge from the point of >> view of a knower), but we can't adduce that fact, a posteriori, in >> support of their having any *ontological* purchase independent of >> their components. > > > Can you define "ontological purchase"? > > >> >> To remind you why I suppose this to be of interest, what is true for >> mountains must hold for any other derivative of "physically-primitive" >> entities and relations. Hence it must hold for any physical >> "computer", whether that be a PC or (putatively) a brain. On this >> analysis, a PC or a brain are *ontologically* (i.e. in terms of the >> target theory) nothing more than physically-primitive entities in >> primary relation. We have already agreed that, ex hypothesi, nothing >> further is required (or could be allowed) in accounting for their >> physical evolution. Physical systems of any description are >> hypothesised to transition from state to state entirely in terms of >> the relations of their physical primitives. >> >> What then is "physical computation" in this schema? It can only be a >> second-order relational concept involving what are already composites >> of the physical primitives in which such putative relata are grounded. >> Hence, a fortiori, it can have no claim to independent ontological >> (i.e. "physical") significance. > > > Why not. I think you're relying on loaded language like "second-order" to > imply your conclusion. Why are "second order" relations not real? What are > "first order" relations? > > >> It merely degenerates to the >> self-sufficient micro-evolution of some aggregation of physical >> primitives; whatever is not entirely "micro-physical" is a further >> attribution *from the perspective of some implicit theory of >> knowledge*. To put it baldly, computation, in terms of any theory >> grounded in physically-primitive relations, isn't a "further physical >> fact"; it just *looks* as if it is. Consequently it can hardly be a >> viable candidate for a "physical correlate" of consciousness, since >> such correlation can be defined only in terms of what is to be >> explained. > > > But you can say exactly the same about numbers and arithmetical relations, > or for that matter souls and spirits. It seems to me you have taken > consciousness to be fundamental - except where you choose not to. Either > consciousness can be explained in terms of something that is not > consciousness or it's fundamental. To a large degree this depends on what > you mean by "explain". I think being able to engineer intelligent, > conscious-like behavior is a good empirical standard of "explain". What > would you count as an explanation? > > >> >>> And isn't that just a confirmation of my point that engineering >>> consciousness is possible, but the "hard problem" is asking a question >>> such >>> that the asker will never be satisfied with any answer. >> >> You were responding to Bruno rather than me here, but I must say I >> can't see that you've really said anything to justify this assertion. >> ISTM at least as much a case of your own distaste for certain kinds of >> question. > > > Whenever I consider a question I ask myself what would an answer look like? > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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