On 5 July 2014 06:27, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as not > existing just because they are not part of the primitive ontology.
But of course I haven't been saying these things don't exist. On the contrary, I've been labouring to differentiate, for the sake of this discussion, two distinct senses of "existence". The first sense picks out the basic ontology of a theory and the second refers to whatever can (putatively) be derived from that ontology on the basis of further epistemological considerations. And I've been pointing out that nothing whose "existence" is picked out only in the the latter sense can be claimed as having any independent relevance (ex hypothesi reductionism) in the evolution of states defined in terms of the former. > In physics the stuff that is most "primitive" in a model is also stuff who's > existence is least certain, e.g. strings, super-symmetric particles, > space-time quanta,... While the stuff you would say doesn't really exist is > the most certain - including the instruments used to infer the primitive > stuff and records of the data taken. That's simply not relevant to the point under discussion. Of course what's most certain is whatever is directly epistemologically available, but we're discussing what our theories may actually imply if we take them *seriously*. The hypothesised ontology may be far less certain, but we are persuaded to entertain it in the first place precisely because we conjecture that the things of which we *are* certain are ultimately its complex epistemological derivatives. >> But this ceases to >> be the case when we propose a second-order relation like computation >> as the "physical correlate" of consciousness, precisely because it >> vitiates the idea that such relations can be anything other than a >> manner of speaking, in terms of the *ontology* of a reductive physical >> theory. Hence, to attribute the ability to evoke conscious states to >> such imaginary or virtual relations would seem to invoke a sort of >> ontological magic. > > I don't see it as any more magic than making mountains out of rocks. You > seem to be invoking an argument from incredulity: Consciousness just can't > be made out of physical stuff or processes. It doesn't take magic to make mountains out of rocks; it requires only that we respect the distinction in a theory between an ontology and its epistemological derivatives. What I was saying is that, under physical reductionism, we can't coherently claim the "ontology of consciousness" to be computation, because the relata picked out by computation simply can't be justified as being independently effective. The relata of computation are, ex hypothesi, epistemologically derivative, abstractions of a *uniquely effective micro-physical ontology*: "strings, super-symmetric particles, space-time quanta". This ineluctable degeneracy to the basement entails that, if you want consciousness to be "made out of physical stuff or processes", that's where you'll find your parts kit. But in any case it is surely rather obvious that we have no business looking for consciousness to be "made out of stuff", unless we are willing to take the stuff alone (i.e. the 3p part) to be consciousness tout court. That would be to eliminate the 1p part and if we stick closely to our theoretical analysis such elimination is obviously incoherent on its face, as the very claim invokes the epistemological derivatives it purports to exclude. Of course I know this isn't what you mean: you accept the 1p part. But the point of my analysis has been to argue that unless we are prepared to consign the latter to mystery (i.e. inaccessibility to further explanation) we should perhaps question whether we aren't being misled by very idea of consciousness being "made out of something". >> Arithmetic, in the first instance, is simply >> posited as the minimal ontological assumption for the construction of >> an explicit epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers); IOW >> what physics explicitly eschews at the outset. From that point the >> explanatory thrust hinges on epistemological considerations and hence >> can no longer be straightforwardly reduced to the first-order >> ontology. > > Yes, that's an interesting aspect of Bruno's theory. He identifies > "provable" with "believes". But the the same kind of thing can be done in a > physical theory: "believes" = "acts as if it were true". There's even a > whole theory of Bayesian inference based on bets. It may not be right, but > it's a theory of epistemology. Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology "after the physical fact". It assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, as when we speak of "acting as if it were true" we have *already abstracted* both ourselves and our actions from the framework of an exhaustive physical reduction that has been hypothesised at the outset as being uniquely effective. That's the whole point and burden of my analysis. So on that basis I disagree that "the same kind of thing can be done in a physical theory". On the comp assumption, by contrast, belief in a truth and "acting as if true", in conjunction with their truth content, are alike derived from the outset as consequences of a fundamentally epistemological theory. One might therefore say that action, belief and truth are hypothesised as being complementary or co-effective, rather than hierarchical-reductive, in relation. >> I think in the case of consciousness, explanation as opposed to >> engineering has to take foundational questions of knowledge and >> reference as seriously as those of physical phenomenology. And I also >> think comp at least provides a possible model of how progress could be >> made in this direction. > > But not a physical, neuroscience based model. You reject that, in spite of > the fact that it has had considerable success. I don't reject it at all. I'm only going so far as saying that ultimately it may lack the explanatory moxie to take us as far as we could go under more comprehensive assumptions. Your stance, I think, is that wherever a future neuroscience is capable of taking us is as far as any reasonable person could expect explanation to reach. To put it more baldly, whatever can't be known in this way just isn't knowable. All I've really been trying to argue for in this thread is that this limit may in the end turn out to be an artefact of a particular explanatory strategy. As to success, I don't recall Einstein being taken to task for dissing the "considerable success" of Newton's theory. In the end any paradigm, however successful, may suffer the fate of being subsumed into a more comprehensive one if certain puzzles stubbornly resist it for long enough. And I'm suggesting that one early but perhaps worrying symptom that this fate may lie somewhere up the road for physical reductionism is a persistent tendency to trivialise, mystify, or eliminate epistemological puzzles that seem to resist capture within the framework of that theory. > So what does an answer look like? Is Turing completeness enough - that's > what Bruno says. But apparently it makes you and a jumping spider equally > conscious. I don't think that's a very good answer. Where is it written that I and a jumping spider are equally conscious? That is, on the assumption that I'm not actually a jumping spider, which I guess is not a matter for complete certainty, in the cyberverse. I think that comp implies only that I and a jumping spider may share a particular species of self-referentiality that is representable in any Turing complete system (indeed, that this is the basis of the "I" shared by all such subjects). Beyond that commonality, the spectrum of subjectivity (i.e. its possible "objects") would extend asymptotically towards infinity, I guess, but always according to the specifics of the logic and statistics extractable from comp. At least, that is the hypothesis and the project. David > On 7/4/2014 6:14 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 4 July 2014 22:36, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>>> Do you wish to say that >>>> mountains have *ontological* significance *in addition* to the rocks >>>> that comprise them? >>> >>> Yes. There could be rocks without there being mountains. >> >> If rocks and their relations are primitive in this analogy, what is >> the independent *ontological* relevance of a mountain *in addition* to >> the rocks that comprise it? What, given ideal knowledge of the >> disposition of rocks, would I fail to account for in terms of their >> further evolution? >> >>>> We accept of course that they exist >>>> *epistemologically* (i.e. as objects of knowledge from the point of >>>> view of a knower), but we can't adduce that fact, a posteriori, in >>>> support of their having any *ontological* purchase independent of >>>> their components. >>> >>> Can you define "ontological purchase"? >> >> I'm merely reiterating that they lack further ontological significance >> in addition to that of their ontological primitives. Please understand >> that this isn't an attempt on my part to impose my ideas on "reality". >> I'm only speaking in terms of the requirements of a theory; and >> whatever a reductive theory takes to be its primitive ontology >> exhausts *by definition* what is ontologically relevant *in terms of >> that theory*. The alternative, I presume, is some form of strong >> ontological emergence - i.e. the idea that, at some higher level of >> organisation, completely novel features, not reducible to the >> basement-level ontology, must be taken into account. > > > Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as not > existing just because they are not part of the primitive ontology. In > physics the stuff that is most "primitive" in a model is also stuff who's > existence is least certain, e.g. strings, super-symmetric particles, > space-time quanta,... While the stuff you would say doesn't really exist is > the most certain - including the instruments used to infer the primitive > stuff and records of the data taken. > > >> >>>> What then is "physical computation" in this schema? It can only be a >>>> second-order relational concept involving what are already composites >>>> of the physical primitives in which such putative relata are grounded. >>>> Hence, a fortiori, it can have no claim to independent ontological >>>> (i.e. "physical") significance. >>> >>> Why not. I think you're relying on loaded language like "second-order" >>> to >>> imply your conclusion. Why are "second order" relations not real? What >>> are >>> "first order" relations? >> >> By first-order relations I just mean those defined in the ontology of >> the theory. Ex hypothesi, they are assumed to do all the theoretical >> work of transitioning from one state to another. Hence, in terms of >> the ontology, it can be assumed that whenever we speak of "higher >> levels" of organisation (e.g. mountains rather than rocks) we are >> making use of a "manner of speaking". IOW we have moved from ontology >> proper to epistemology, since the "higher level" has no independent >> ontological relevance. It is assumed to be an aggregation of >> first-order relations (e.g. a mountain is just rocks in relation). >> >> By second-order relations, I mean relations that are not simply >> hierarchical-reductive (such as mountains and rocks). Secondary >> relations such as those of computation can be *attributed* to all >> manner of physical systems which are transitioning from state to state >> at the level of first-order relations. Hence, they too lack >> independent ontological significance; they too are epistemological >> constructs, albeit at one level removed from the reductive hierarchy, >> as it were. >> >> Note again that I'm not trying to rule on what is "real". I'm wielding >> Occam's razor at the theoretical level. It's just *not necessary* (in >> fact it's disallowed) to attribute ontological relevance to anything >> above the basement in a reductive theory; that's the whole point of >> the reductive strategy. Of course, we don't emphasise this distinction >> in ordinary talk, or even in most scientific discourse, because in >> purely 3p terms it is largely without consequence. But this ceases to >> be the case when we propose a second-order relation like computation >> as the "physical correlate" of consciousness, precisely because it >> vitiates the idea that such relations can be anything other than a >> manner of speaking, in terms of the *ontology* of a reductive physical >> theory. Hence, to attribute the ability to evoke conscious states to >> such imaginary or virtual relations would seem to invoke a sort of >> ontological magic. > > > I don't see it as any more magic than making mountains out of rocks. You > seem to be invoking an argument from incredulity: Consciousness just can't > be made out of physical stuff or processes. > > >> >>>> It merely degenerates to the >>>> self-sufficient micro-evolution of some aggregation of physical >>>> primitives; whatever is not entirely "micro-physical" is a further >>>> attribution *from the perspective of some implicit theory of >>>> knowledge*. To put it baldly, computation, in terms of any theory >>>> grounded in physically-primitive relations, isn't a "further physical >>>> fact"; it just *looks* as if it is. Consequently it can hardly be a >>>> viable candidate for a "physical correlate" of consciousness, since >>>> such correlation can be defined only in terms of what is to be >>>> explained. >>> >>> But you can say exactly the same about numbers and arithmetical >>> relations, >>> or for that matter souls and spirits. >> >> What do you mean, "but"? You seem to be arguing both ends here. You >> can't consistently reject my argument on the one hand, whilst at the >> same time use it as a weapon against alternative ontologies. Anyway, >> since I'm not an apologist for souls and spirits, I won't comment. But >> I've already said several times why I don't believe the argument holds >> in the case of numbers and arithmetical relations, at least in the way >> Bruno deploys them. Arithmetic, in the first instance, is simply >> posited as the minimal ontological assumption for the construction of >> an explicit epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers); IOW >> what physics explicitly eschews at the outset. From that point the >> explanatory thrust hinges on epistemological considerations and hence >> can no longer be straightforwardly reduced to the first-order >> ontology. > > > Yes, that's an interesting aspect of Bruno's theory. He identifies > "provable" with "believes". But the the same kind of thing can be done in a > physical theory: "believes" = "acts as if it were true". There's even a > whole theory of Bayesian inference based on bets. It may not be right, but > it's a theory of epistemology. > > Brent > > >> >>> It seems to me you have taken >>> consciousness to be fundamental - except where you choose not to. >> >> I have never said anything of the sort. And, by the way, I'm not a >> "believer" in comp, I'm just trying to understand how it works. So my >> understanding is that consciousness is modelled in comp as >> coterminous, in some special sense, with truth. I tried to give an >> example of that in terms of "visual belief" and its corresponding >> truth content: what I see. If you like, the incommunicable 1p part of >> consciousness is what makes the 3p part true. That's another reason >> for disbelieving in zombies: if a system embodies the appropriate >> "belief" then the corresponding truth has a constitutive relation with >> it. IOW, truth in this sense isn't an optional extra. I think this is >> a neat idea; it seems to capture at least something right about the >> "mystery" of the first-person and I'd like to see where else it might >> lead. >> >>> Either >>> consciousness can be explained in terms of something that is not >>> consciousness or it's fundamental. >> >> Sure, and as I've said I think that the relations I've (inadequately) >> outlined above may lead to more fruitful explanations than >> consciousness-as-physical-reduction. >> >>> To a large degree this depends on what >>> you mean by "explain". I think being able to engineer intelligent, >>> conscious-like behavior is a good empirical standard of "explain". >> >> Well, I certainly used to believe that the best way of explaining a >> program was to write it. >> >>> What >>> would you count as an explanation? >> >> I think in the case of consciousness, explanation as opposed to >> engineering has to take foundational questions of knowledge and >> reference as seriously as those of physical phenomenology. And I also >> think comp at least provides a possible model of how progress could be >> made in this direction. > > > But not a physical, neuroscience based model. You reject that, in spite of > the fact that it has had considerable success. > > >> On the one hand, it's all very well to say >> "Look, I just made something that is conscious" (though of course I >> would hardly sniff at that achievement!). But we might be able to do >> that just by using our engineering ingenuity to "copy Nature". I don't >> think it's meaningless or impossible to ask for more. > > > Nor do I. But I think engineering consciousness will lead to theories of > different aspects, types, and degrees of "consciousness". Consciousness > will be complex, many faceted field with different effective theories which > may or may not unify. The theories will explain the effect of alcohol, > salvia, and localized trauma in humans. It will explicate the difference > between the consciousness of children and adults, between dogs and bats. > > >> >>> Whenever I consider a question I ask myself what would an answer look >>> like? >> >> Me too. And I think that comp, even in its present nascent stage of >> development, can already give the lie to any suggestion that we have >> no idea what such an answer could look like. > > > So what does an answer look like? Is Turing completeness enough - that's > what Bruno says. But apparently it makes you and a jumping spider equally > conscious. I don't think that's a very good answer. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
