On 11 Jul 2014, at 22:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2014 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jul 2014, at 09:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2014 00:54, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
As I understand the MGA it assumes physicalism and then purports
to show
that computation still exists with minimal or zero physical
activity - it
evaucates the physics and keeps the computation.
For heaven's sake, Brent! This is what you originally said to Liz.
What you're referring to is Maudlin's argument. It's the
*opposite* of
my understanding of the MGA, which seeks to show how physical action
can be preserved unchanged even in cases where the original
"computational relations" have been completely disrupted. I spent
several paragraphs describing this with additional examples. You
then
commented this with "I agree with all you wrote", which led to some
further discussion based (as I thought) on this understanding.
Your comment above now leaves me hopelessly confused. I would be
grateful if you would review our recent discussion and clarify what
you do or do not agree with in my analysis.
I think that it will help to define perhaps more precisely what is
a computation.
I will reread the thread (many posts) when I have more time, and
make only one comment.
We have a computation when a universal machine compute something.
We have an intensional Post-Church thesis 'which follows from the
usual Post-Church-Turing thesis), which makes possible to translate
"universal machine compute something" in term of numbers addition
and multiplication + one existential quantifier.
Now, when are two computations the same? If we fix a base phi_i, we
might define a computations by sequences of step of the universal
base computing some phi_k, that is the nth steps phi_k(j)^n of the
computation by the base of the program k on the input j, with n =
0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
But now that very computation will recure infinitely often, and not
always in (algorithmically) recognizable way.
You can conceive it might not be obvious that the evolution of a
game of life pattern (GOL is Turing-universal) is simulating a
Fortran interpreter simulating a Lisp program computing the ph(j)^n
above.
And is it not the case that there will exist a mapping to a
different base such that this same evolution of the GOL is
simulating a Python interpreter computing some different phi. This
why I have trouble with the concept to two computations being "in
the same state". ISTM that "same state" is relative to the
enumerated basis functions and the functions cannot be recognized
from any finite sequence of states.
That is exactly why our computations, with and without (and in
between) their environment (with and without oracles) recurre
infinitely often in the sigma_1 truth (UD*).
So two computations can be the same at some level of description,
and yet occurs in quite different "places" in the UD*.
Is there a canonical level of description at which they are the same,
Yes. When the level of description is chosen correct, it can be the
same from your or God (arithmetic truth) view. But it is not a
constructive or intuitionist notion (like "not-halting", computer
science is full of such type truth).
or are you just saying there exists some mapping which makes them
the same over a finite number of steps?
No. It is for a possibly infinite number of steps. the number of steps
is not relevant. It is misleading to define a computation only by a
sequence of steps. It is a sequence of step + a universal machine or
number bringing those computational steps. That makes a computation
well defined.
Comp says that there is a level of description of myself such that
those computation *at the correct level" "carries my consciousness".
There's where I agree with JKC. You keep fudging what "comp"
means. The above is *not* the same as betting that the doctor can
give you a physical brain prosthesis that maintains your
consciousness.
I don't see this. Please explain.
But Brent, and Peter Jones, adds that the computation have to be
done by a "real thing".
This is a bit like either choosing some particular universal number
pr, and called it "physical reality", and add the axioms that only
the phi_pr computations counts: the phi_pr (j)^n.
I think Peter, like me, questions the existence of numbers as any
more than elements fo language.
This is conventionalism. I consider that this view is refuted by
number theory implicitly, and by mathematical logic explicitly. The
existence of not of infinitely many prime number twins is everythi,g
but conventional. With comp, the existence of your dreams in
arithmetic, and their relative proportions, are not conventional.
So it is not like choosing a universal number, it's saying that some
things exist and some don't.
Define "exist". If you say "exists physically" then you beg the
question, and I will ask you to define "physics".
Well, this would just select (without argument)
It's based on observation not axiomatic inference.
That is explain in the comp theory. Observation is an internal
modality of the arithmetical truth.
You are using some "real existence" fuzzy notion to make a reasoning
invalid, in the same way that a creationist can say that "Evolution
Theory" needs a God-of-the-gap.
a special sub-universal dovetailing among (any) universal
dovetailing. The only "force" here is that somehow the quantum
Everet wave, seen as such a phi_pr do solve the measure problem
(accepting Gleason theorem does its job).
But just choosing that phi_pr does not solve the mind-body problem,
only the body problem in a superficial way (losing the non
justifiable parts notably).
Or they make that physical reality non computable (as comp needs,
but they conjecture that it differs from the non (entirely)
computable physics that we can extract from arithmetic (with comp).
But then it is just a statement like "your plane will not fly".
Let us make the test, and up to now it works.
Yes, I'm willing to accept your argument as an hypothesis.
Comp is the hypothesis. the argument is not.
But it seems to me that it proves that consciousness and physics
necessarily complement one another.
It is more than that. It makes physics the analog of a surface of what
is real independent of me (the mind of the universal machine) which is
more like a volume having that physical surface as a border.
Starting from arithmetic you must solve both the mind problem and
the body problem at the same time. I don't see that you've made
psychology more fundamental than physics. You've made arithmetic
more fundamental.
ARITHMETIC ==> NUMBER's PSYCHOLOGY ==> CONSCIOUSNESS ==> MATTER
APPEARANCE ===> PHYSICS.
I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that
reducing does not eliminate. But we can't use that to compare
consciousness/neurons to temperature/molecules-kinetic. In that
later case we reduce a 3p high level to a 3p lower level. And
indeed, this does not eliminate temperature. But in the case of
consciousness, we have consciousness which is 1p, and neurons which
are 3p. Here, the whole 3p, be it the arithmetical or physical
reality fails (when taken as a complete explanation). The higher
level 1p notions are not just higher 3p description, it is the
intimate non justifiable (and infinite) part of a person, which
wonderfully enough provably becomes a non-machine, and a non
nameable entity, when we apply the definition of Theaetetus
definition to the machine.
But what does it mean to "apply a definition to a machine". And why
should we apply *that* definition, which is far from axiomatic.
The accepted axiomatic is T or S4, that is []p -> p (with or without
[]p -> [][]p).
machine's have their "[]" well defined, and to apply the Theatetus'
definition consist in define knowledge of p by []p & p.
This is then a definition of knowledge which is applicable to
(correct) machine, which can then be defined in some axiomatic. But
you are right, although we get an axiomatic at the meta-level (S4Grz),
it describes an entity which is not capturable by an axiomatic (that's
the vaccine against reductionism).
Interesting! We are at the crux of the crux! I see that Gerson(*)
follows Socrates, and take the Theaetetus definition ([]p & p) as a
"description" of knowledge, but the universal machine can
understand that this is not true when applied on machine
(ironically enough). The modal "[]p & p" can define knowledge
without providing any description or code. "Worst" (but this is why
this strategy works!), not only "[]p & p" definition does not
provide a description of the knower, but it is constructively
immune against all descriptions. The apparently little inner god,
is a god from his own first person view, that here, he share with
the outer god. (if machine and self-referentially correct).
This seems to be your love of mysticism turning wishes into proofs.
You think it is right *because* it fails description.
It is enough to make Gerson invalid. (Despite it get close to the
point and he concludes like me that the modern should read and borrow
some part of Plotinus). Gerson is just not aware how far the machines
makes it correct, except for his somehow naive view of Theaetetus'
definition. he becomes correct on Plotinus. He is just not correct on
the machine's Bp & p notion.
You seem to be the one invoking wishes of primary matter *and* comp,
but the argument shows that it simply not work.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
(*)
http://www.amazon.com/Ancient-Epistemology-Key-Themes-Philosophy/dp/0521871395
David
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