On 11 July 2014 19:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that reducing > does not eliminate.
You are a little too quick here with your "everybody", since obviously my whole point has been that I *don't* agree! I would remind you that, in an earlier iteration of this argument with Peter Jones, you said that 3p reductive explanation eliminates *ontologically*, but not *epistemologically*. This, essentially, is the distinction I've been insisting on. > But we can't use that to compare consciousness/neurons > to temperature/molecules-kinetic. > In that later case we reduce a 3p high > level to a 3p lower level. And indeed, this does not eliminate temperature. Well, if you still hold to your earlier opinion, you should agree that, in terms of an explanatory hierarchy based on an ontology of molecular kinetics, temperature must be considered to have been eliminated *ontologically* (i.e. to have been revealed as *nothing more than* the underlying kinetics). However, it remains as a datum of epistemology , i.e. as an "object" of knowledge, perception, or cognition. Hence it can still be appealed to in explanation *in general* as long as we don't forget the original distinction at some later point in the argument when it begins to beg the question at issue. > But in the case of consciousness, we have consciousness which is 1p, and > neurons which are 3p. Here, the whole 3p, be it the arithmetical or physical > reality fails (when taken as a complete explanation). The higher level 1p > notions are not just higher 3p description, it is the intimate non > justifiable (and infinite) part of a person, which wonderfully enough > provably becomes a non-machine, and a non nameable entity, when we apply > > the definition of Theaetetus definition to the machine. I agree with all of this (indeed I've been arguing for it) but I think that the ontology/epistemology distinction I've been attempting to defend can be used to construct a reductio against the completeness, or coherence, of any exclusively 3p explanatory hierarchy. If so, this may help to further clarify arguments against the compatibility of physicalism and computationalism such as the MGA. The ontology/epistemology distinction could also perhaps be seen as noumenal/phenomenal. ISTM that 3p, in any explanatory strategy, is noumenal in that it cannot be known directly but stands for whatever is presumed to account for what we *can* and *do* know. So one might say that physicalism is the attempt to construct a TOE entirely in noumenal terms, "independent" of knowledge: a "view from nowhere". ISTM that the problem this creates is exposed in at least two distinct ways. Firstly, it turns out that it is impossible FAPP to construct a reductive explanation in wholly 3p terms. All such explanations rely on levels of an explanatory hierarchy that are properly phenomenal in terms of the putative explanatory noumenon, such as temperature with respect to molecular kinetics. IOW, "temperature" is a phenomenon of molecular kinetics, or to put in terms of epistemology/ontology, temperature is what can be *known* with respect to molecular kinetics, as distinct from an ontological *supplement* to that kinetics. Hence it can be seen that an explanatory strategy that starts as an attempt to explain "everything" in terms of a 3p or noumenal ontology can't help but lay its sticky metaphysical fingers on properly phenomenal or epistemological explananda. Should it then tacitly use such explananda to *explain themselves* (as I argue in the case of computation-consciousness under physicalist assumptions) it cannot help but place itself in a viciously circular explanatory bind. OK, one may respond, let's redeem the viciousness of the circularity by explicitly abandoning the phenomenal or epistemological explananda. Who needs 'em, after all, ex hypothesi, the 3p basement-level explanatory machinery is supposed to "work by itself", isn't it? But this immediately exposes the second, or complementary, problem in any purely 3p explanatory strategy. Although we can still refer to an ontological schema that is, in principle, complete (I mean, everything could be "just the wave function", couldn't it?) we have now abandoned that schema entirely to the noumenal. And nothing in the noumenal explanatory basement can ever be knowable. So it is at this point its seeming "completeness" becomes really worrying, because it tends in the direction of the elimination of phenomena tout court. This would surely be to argue for "zombie existence" in a peculiarly radical way, in that the zombie, or indeed any separable entity, is now not merely unknowing but unknowable (i.e. non-phenomenal). Obviously, if comp is to avoid the same criticism, we must be able to show that it isn't prone to the same inherent deficiencies. IIUC, the 3p or noumenal level of explanation in comp isn't exactly number relations simpliciter, but rather computation *as emulated by* some minimal first-order combinatorial ontology (such as RA). FAPP, in terms of the comp explanatory strategy, this comes to be represented by the infinite trace of the UD. It might, I guess, be arguable that computation is a "phenomenon" of arithmetic, but certainly not in any straightforwardly hierarchical sense analogous to, say, temperature/molecular kinetics. Whatever the nuances, computation - and in particular its self-referential sub-class - is the singular "phenomenon" explicitly relied on in the noumenal explanatory basement. From this point forward the explanatory strategy necessarily shifts from the noumenal "view from nowhere" to the epistemological "view from everywhere"; or from 3p to 1p (plural). That is to say, all "phenomena" must from here on be justified by reference to *explicitly knowable* modalities of logic and truth, filtered from the computational everything, by the competing points of view of its "noumenal machinery". Consequently physics - and in particular its proprietary reductive hierarchy of explanation - is no longer posited at the unknowable, 3p or noumenal level, but rather entirely and exclusively at the knowable, phenomenal or 1p-plural level, where it must appear both in its formal (reducible) and informal (irreducible) guises. This crucial "yin-yang" nuance is what points to a possible resolution of the "apparently inner" with the "apparently outer", aka the paradox of phenomenal judgement, or more simply the mind-body problem. David > > On 11 Jul 2014, at 09:41, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 11 July 2014 00:54, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> As I understand the MGA it assumes physicalism and then purports to show >>> that computation still exists with minimal or zero physical activity - it >>> evaucates the physics and keeps the computation. >> >> >> For heaven's sake, Brent! This is what you originally said to Liz. >> What you're referring to is Maudlin's argument. It's the *opposite* of >> my understanding of the MGA, which seeks to show how physical action >> can be preserved unchanged even in cases where the original >> "computational relations" have been completely disrupted. I spent >> several paragraphs describing this with additional examples. You then >> commented this with "I agree with all you wrote", which led to some >> further discussion based (as I thought) on this understanding. >> >> Your comment above now leaves me hopelessly confused. I would be >> grateful if you would review our recent discussion and clarify what >> you do or do not agree with in my analysis. > > > > I think that it will help to define perhaps more precisely what is a > computation. > > I will reread the thread (many posts) when I have more time, and make only > one comment. > > We have a computation when a universal machine compute something. We have an > intensional Post-Church thesis 'which follows from the usual > Post-Church-Turing thesis), which makes possible to translate "universal > machine compute something" in term of numbers addition and multiplication + > one existential quantifier. > > Now, when are two computations the same? If we fix a base phi_i, we might > define a computations by sequences of step of the universal base computing > some phi_k, that is the nth steps phi_k(j)^n of the computation by the base > of the program k on the input j, with n = 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. > > But now that very computation will recure infinitely often, and not always > in (algorithmically) recognizable way. > > You can conceive it might not be obvious that the evolution of a game of > life pattern (GOL is Turing-universal) is simulating a Fortran interpreter > simulating a Lisp program computing the ph(j)^n above. > > That is exactly why our computations, with and without (and in between) > their environment (with and without oracles) recurre infinitely often in the > sigma_1 truth (UD*). > > So two computations can be the same at some level of description, and yet > occurs in quite different "places" in the UD*. > > Comp says that there is a level of description of myself such that those > computation *at the correct level" "carries my consciousness". > > But Brent, and Peter Jones, adds that the computation have to be done by a > "real thing". > This is a bit like either choosing some particular universal number pr, and > called it "physical reality", and add the axioms that only the phi_pr > computations counts: the phi_pr (j)^n. > > Well, this would just select (without argument) a special sub-universal > dovetailing among (any) universal dovetailing. The only "force" here is that > somehow the quantum Everet wave, seen as such a phi_pr do solve the measure > problem (accepting Gleason theorem does its job). > > But just choosing that phi_pr does not solve the mind-body problem, only the > body problem in a superficial way (losing the non justifiable parts > notably). > > Or they make that physical reality non computable (as comp needs, but they > conjecture that it differs from the non (entirely) computable physics that > we can extract from arithmetic (with comp). But then it is just a statement > like "your plane will not fly". Let us make the test, and up to now it > works. > > I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that reducing > does not eliminate. But we can't use that to compare consciousness/neurons > to temperature/molecules-kinetic. In that later case we reduce a 3p high > level to a 3p lower level. And indeed, this does not eliminate temperature. > But in the case of consciousness, we have consciousness which is 1p, and > neurons which are 3p. Here, the whole 3p, be it the arithmetical or physical > reality fails (when taken as a complete explanation). The higher level 1p > notions are not just higher 3p description, it is the intimate non > justifiable (and infinite) part of a person, which wonderfully enough > provably becomes a non-machine, and a non nameable entity, when we apply the > definition of Theaetetus definition to the machine. > > Interesting! We are at the crux of the crux! I see that Gerson(*) follows > Socrates, and take the Theaetetus definition ([]p & p) as a "description" of > knowledge, but the universal machine can understand that this is not true > when applied on machine (ironically enough). The modal "[]p & p" can define > knowledge without providing any description or code. "Worst" (but this is > why this strategy works!), not only "[]p & p" definition does not provide a > description of the knower, but it is constructively immune against all > descriptions. The apparently little inner god, is a god from his own first > person view, that here, he share with the outer god. (if machine and > self-referentially correct). > > Bruno > > (*) > http://www.amazon.com/Ancient-Epistemology-Key-Themes-Philosophy/dp/0521871395 > >> >> David >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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