On 12 July 2014 20:34, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > Of course they wouldn't because "17 is a prime number" is a tautology. It's > true simply in virtue of it's meaning like "x is x". But is it a fact about > the world or just a fact about language?
I must confess to being somewhat flabbergasted that we're still debating the semantics and metaphysical provenance of numbers as if it were in any way relevant to the fundamental topics under discussion. Of course we can use the the vocabulary of numbers in everyday terms as a proxy for whatever practical grasp of mathematics has been achieved by humans as a product of their evolutionary engagement with their bodies and the wider environment. Many years ago I read a fascinating little book called The Psychology of Learning Mathematics, on that very topic. But I can't see in what way this is relevant to their role in the explanatory "ontology" of comp. What we call physical theory boils down, I guess, to the view that a particular, restricted class of *special* mathematical relations can ultimately be shown sufficient to derive all subsequent phenomena that require explanation. Comp, on the other hand, postulates that this apparently special class can be shown, more fundamentally, to be a spectrum of epistemological phenomena ultimately derivable from the implications of number relations alone. Of course, in either case, everything depends on the "can be shown" part and the extent to which this is achievable is the extent, in the end, to which anyone should take the putative ontologies seriously. Perhaps it's a little ironical that, these days, both cosmological and micro-physical theorising (at least in certain circles) seem to be converging. like comp, on a species of observer-selection as a means of justifying their putatively special class (or now classes) of "ultimate" physical relations. Only comp, AFAICT, has focused specifically on the *mechanics of observation* as central in such selection, or on number relations simpliciter as its ultimately sufficient combinatorial ontology. But my point remains, that in any other respects than those stated above, arguments over the metaphysical provenance of numbers, just like those over that of "material stuff", are beside the point. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
