On 13 Jul 2014, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 12 July 2014 20:34, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course they wouldn't because "17 is a prime number" is a
tautology. It's
true simply in virtue of it's meaning like "x is x". But is it a
fact about
the world or just a fact about language?
I must confess to being somewhat flabbergasted that we're still
debating the semantics and metaphysical provenance of numbers as if it
were in any way relevant to the fundamental topics under discussion.
Agreed. especially that for numbers (or any Turing-complete theory),
we know that if we assume less, we don't get them.
In fact numbers are assumed in all (scientific) theories, and people
nitpicking on them introduce useless metaphysics about them.
Of course we can use the the vocabulary of numbers in everyday terms
as a proxy for whatever practical grasp of mathematics has been
achieved by humans as a product of their evolutionary engagement with
their bodies and the wider environment. Many years ago I read a
fascinating little book called The Psychology of Learning Mathematics,
on that very topic. But I can't see in what way this is relevant to
their role in the explanatory "ontology" of comp.
What we call physical theory boils down, I guess, to the view that a
particular, restricted class of *special* mathematical relations can
ultimately be shown sufficient to derive all subsequent phenomena that
require explanation. Comp, on the other hand, postulates that this
apparently special class can be shown, more fundamentally, to be a
spectrum of epistemological phenomena ultimately derivable from the
implications of number relations alone. Of course, in either case,
everything depends on the "can be shown" part and the extent to which
this is achievable is the extent, in the end, to which anyone should
take the putative ontologies seriously.
Can be shown? Perhaps. But UDA shows that it *must* be shown, and if
it can't, then comp is refuted. Then the AUDA shows that a quantum
quantization obeying Quantum logic (as far as we know for now) appears
exactly where UDA says that it must appear (the logic of the measure 1).
Perhaps it's a little ironical that, these days, both cosmological and
micro-physical theorising (at least in certain circles) seem to be
converging. like comp, on a species of observer-selection as a means
of justifying their putatively special class (or now classes) of
"ultimate" physical relations. Only comp, AFAICT, has focused
specifically on the *mechanics of observation* as central in such
selection, or on number relations simpliciter as its ultimately
sufficient combinatorial ontology. But my point remains, that in any
other respects than those stated above, arguments over the
metaphysical provenance of numbers, just like those over that of
"material stuff", are beside the point.
OK.
Bruno
David
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