On 14 July 2014 18:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> Such
>> explanations are bottom up all the way down. Hence there is simply no
>> place in that explanatory hierarchy for any supplementary notion of
>> "computation" distinguishable from what is already fully embodied in
>> physical action.
>
> Hmm... You do the non relevant "mistake" again (or I misinterpret you
> badly). I am afraid that what you say here for physics can be applied to
> arithmetic too.
No doubt I may be mistaken (I'm trying to be clear enough to be
wrong). Computation per se may indeed be reducible to "just the basic
number relations", in something like the sense that matter, under
physicalism (phys), is reducible to "just the basic physical
relations". But ISTM, that comp is "redeemed" from (or as you say
vaccinated against) reduction (and by the same token zombie-hood) by
the irreducible emergence of the internal views. It is much more
difficult to see how phys can be redeemed in any comparable way
without resorting at least tacitly to comp (at which point the
difficulties begin anew).
> This in my opinion already does not eliminate the "reality" of the 3p
> high level description, but of course constitutes a threat to eliminate the
> role of consciousness.
But do you think that the 3p high-level description would be equally
"real" if (somehow) it were not ultimately redeemable by the internal
views (e.g. if, counter-factually, my own high-level 3p description
merely resulted in "zombie-hood")?
> Here physicalism fails, almost because it is not interested in
> consciousness. Here QM (and especially Everett-QM) should open the mind of
> the physicists that such a reductionism "mind = brain state" is failing.
Yes, this is the point I have been making for some time now.
> But the machine itself has a natural knower associated to it.
Forgive me for not commenting more extensively on your remarks (which
I will study) but this seems to me to be the absolutely capital point.
ISTM above all else that a "natural knower" is the crux of the
redemption of the first person from exhaustive physical reduction and
effective elimination. It's precisely the radical absence of such a
natural knower in the reductive hierarchy of phys - indeed the
irrelevance of such a knower to its defining mode of explanation -
that I've continually had in mind. Of course, it may still seem open
to phys to make a grab for the knower associated to the machine,
unless the conjunction of comp and phys can be shown to be
incompatible, or at least lead to the explanatory irrelevance of the
latter.
>> I can understand your attitude here, and I draw the same conclusion,
>> but I still think it a pity to miss any potential opportunity to
>> de-construct the notion of physical computation in its own terms.
>
> All right, just be careful to not de-construct 3p computer science and
> 3p-number theory in the same élan :)
Hmm.. that would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed. However, as I've said,
ISTM that comp, unlike phys, has the internal resources to resist any
analogous de-construction.
David
>
> On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 13 July 2014 22:01, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>> Well, if you still hold to your earlier opinion, you should agree
>>>> that, in terms of an explanatory hierarchy based on an ontology of
>>>> molecular kinetics, temperature must be considered to have been
>>>> eliminated *ontologically* (i.e. to have been revealed as *nothing
>>>> more than* the underlying kinetics).
>>>
>>>
>>> I can, and see what you mean, but I prefer not, because I am realist on
>>> the
>>> relations and higher 3p description too.
>>
>>
>> Well, I'm still not really convinced that the fundamental assumptions
>> of physical reduction justify your realism on the higher-level
>> descriptions.
>
>
> I see, and perhaps I should not have made that remark here, as it is
> distracting from the issue that you discuss with Brent.
> I really don't think it is important (here).
>
>
>
>
>> But actually I'm not even sure that one need insist on
>> this to stop the notion of "physical computation" dead in its tracks.
>
>
> But only through the MGA, because at step seven, we might still, from a
> logical point of view, make a move toward the assumption that the "real"
> physical is not robust enough to run a significant part of the UD*.
> Of course that move is ad hoc, and then MGA attempts to show how much that
> move is ad hoc.
>
> But the existence or not of high level 3p objects is not really relevant to
> "kill" the notion of physical computation, or of primitively physical
> entities.
>
>
>
>
>
>> And of course if one can do this then it must also, a fortiori, put a
>> stop to any idea of linking any such notion with consciousness. This
>> reductio was really the point of my argument and if I had to sum it up
>> for "grandma" I would say that the key idea is just that, ex hypothesi
>> physicalism, action of any sort and at whatever level of description
>> must always be reducible to *physical action simpliciter*. So
>> accepting physics as a TOE is equivalent to accepting both that no
>> possible action can be omitted from its explanatory scope and that no
>> further class of action need be appealed to in accounting for any
>> physical state of affairs.
>>
>> I think from that one can already get the idea that, under such
>> assumptions, supplementary notions such as computation are simply
>> *redundant* in explaining physical action. Indeed the MGA itself
>> exploits this basic insight by showing how relations originally
>> accepted as "computational" can be entirely evacuated from a physical
>> system whilst preserving the same net physical action (including, pace
>> Brent, the same relations with a physical environment). Even in the
>> case that we accept a notion of physical computation as an a
>> posteriori attribution, that attribution cannot retrospectively be
>> accepted as adding anything to the exhaustive "reductive hierarchy" of
>> the physical object or system in question. To put it baldly, under
>> physicalism, a PC or a brain is, at whatever level of description, a
>> physical object first last and always. Any action associated with that
>> object must, under the same assumptions, be exhaustively reducible to
>> the explanatory basement of physical entities and relations. Such
>> explanations are bottom up all the way down. Hence there is simply no
>> place in that explanatory hierarchy for any supplementary notion of
>> "computation" distinguishable from what is already fully embodied in
>> physical action.
>
>
> Hmm... You do the non relevant "mistake" again (or I misinterpret you
> badly). I am afraid that what you say here for physics can be applied to
> arithmetic too.
>
> As long as we are interested only in 3p descriptions, with comp, (and with
> or without physicalism) we do explain completely the observable or
> describable action. If my goal is to predicted which next move Deep Blue,
> the chess program, will do, I can contend myself to start from its state
> description at the boolean gate level, and "explain" (even predict if I am
> quick enough, or if Deep Blue is put in pause!) the next move by just
> applying (a lot of times) the logical rules of the NOR, and its delays, like
> in principles, I can predict that Jeanne will put her hands quickly out of
> the fire, by solving the quantum many body problems involved at some low
> level. This in my opinion already does not eliminate the "reality" of the 3p
> high level description, but of course constitutes a threat to eliminate the
> role of consciousness.
> Here physicalism fails, almost because it is not interested in
> consciousness. Here QM (and especially Everett-QM) should open the mind of
> the physicists that such a reductionism "mind = brain state" is failing.
>
> With comp, in UDA, the mind-body problem is shown to give this new problem:
> explaining why apparently some sophisticated long quantum histories (the
> making of special universe numbers) have won the competition between all
> computations (as simpler concept definable in arithmetic, already assumed at
> some level by the physicists).
>
> At that stage, it is unclear if a solution of that problem (which would
> explain where matter comes from) would solve the hard problem of
> consciousness.
>
> But that changes naturally, when you decide to interview the machines about
> she expected to live, assuming she is a machine, and indeed the machine we
> know the relevant 3p description of.
>
> Then, as John Clark wisely insists, we face the problem of defining the
> pronoun "she".
>
> And, as John Clark unwisely avoids, I provide the definition and the
> precision. Actually, in UDA, I distinguish the 1p from the 3p uniquely by
> using the content of memories describable in something (brain, diary) going
> through the classical teleport (duplicating or not, ..) device. It is
> already a meta 3p distinction between 1p and 3p, which appears to be enough
> to get that physics ultimately has to become a branch of
> arithmetic/computer-science.
>
> But this, again, does not address the hard problem of consciousness, and
> someone could at that stage, this believes that somehow, consciousness is
> still unexplained if not eliminable.
>
> It is in AUDA, that consciousness is eventually saved, at least for the
> correct (arithmetically sound) machine. In AUDA the definition of the 3p
> machine self, will be its internal representation of itself. Here the trick
> is provided by Cantor-Gödel-Kleene D'X' = T('XX') (with a special "quote"
> allowing substitution of the variable X) and T any transformation. This is
> the base of the logic of self-reference, of []p, that is G, and G*, which
> describe what a machine can prove and not prove about its provability
> abilities. It associated a set of belief to the machine, including beliefs
> about itself. But that is only the 3p view on the 3p view. Such machine will
> still say "I will be in W" and "I will be in Moscow" in the duplication
> scenario.
>
> But the machine itself has a natural knower associated to it. Indeed, by
> incompleteness although it is true that []p is equivalent to []p & p, (G*
> proves the equivalence), it is false from the machine points of view (G
> can't prove that equivalence, except in the classically trivial case where
> the machine or G proves p). This is a first person "I", that the machine is
> not able to name, describe, define, and in fact would say "no" to the
> doctor, as she can't identify herself (with that 1p pronoun) with *any* 3p
> describable things.
>
> The hard problem of consciousness is solved at the theoretical computer
> science level, by showing that the simplest notion of knowledge (true
> belief), applied to ideally arithmetically correct believer in numbers or
> machines, gives an intuitionist temporal knower which say "no" to the
> doctor, until he conceives that his "no" is not justifiable, and that he
> might say "yes" but agreeing it would be a religious act.
>
> The solution is that the God of comp (actually the second greek god: the
> noùs, G*) knows that []p <-> []p & p, but the machines cannot consistently
> belief this for any (arithmetical) p. Somehow, God knows that the soul is
> equivalent to the machine, but the soul cannot know this, nor can the
> machine consistently assert it. Yet the machine can know that fact, and has
> many means to circumscribe the truth or point on it, making her, in her
> evolution, more aware of its ignorance.
>
> Here consciousness is somehow related to the machine ignorance of God, like
> if the brain acted as a (divine, true)-information filter.
> Self-consciousness is somehow the result of God's delusion when forgetting
> himself in "his" creation, matter appears, in this image, where that deluded
> God loss control.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> In the end, the point is that, as you argue yourself, computation is a
>> fundamentally mathematical (indeed an arithmetical) notion, not a
>> physical one.
>
>
> OK. Computations, or finite piece of computations, are both abstract high
> level relations existing between numbers (indeed the solutions of one
> special diophantine degree four polynomial equation is already enough), and
> can be described by numbers, both in extension, of by naming a universal
> number, a machine and a step-interval.
>
> The crazy miracle, is that the partial computable, including non
> constructively the total computable, is closed for the most transcendent
> operation in math: diagonalization. That makes Church-thesis very plausible,
> and that is, like Judson Webb explains already very well, a strong argument
> in its favor and in favor of mechanism. It permits also the existence of an
> effective universal entity, capable of mirroring all the others, and
> sometimes confusing itself with some one.
>
>
>
>
>
>> And clearly computation as a whole is more extensive
>> than any of its sub-classes.
>
>
> More or equal. UD* contained infinities of version of UD*, like the
> Mandelbrot set.
>
>
>
>
>> Consequently, it must be the case that,
>> although one can construct an argument for the emergence of physical
>> relations in the form of an observer-dependent sub-class of
>> computation, there simply can be no parallel argument available in the
>> opposite direction.
>
>
> Not if we assume CTM, indeed. Without CTM, that might be possible ... or
> not.
>
> Mathematical or arithmetical notion of self-referentially correct
> super-entity (non turing emulable) exists (= even the majority in
> arithmetic), but the physical measure problem is just re-casted at higher
> levels of the insolubility hierarchy, and at the propositional level, most
> still obeys to G and G*, but it is an open problem if with some
> "non-machine" we can escape the Löbian fate. Near death, we might, but that
> would be a God self-remembering. Both the outer God and the inner God
> escapes Löbianity, for them, being a machine might be a transitory state.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Then I think it helps to single what is precisely difficult in
>>> consciousness
>>> which will be the modal difference, instead of a 3p higher description.
>>
>>
>> I can understand your attitude here, and I draw the same conclusion,
>> but I still think it a pity to miss any potential opportunity to
>> de-construct the notion of physical computation in its own terms.
>
>
> All right, just be careful to not de-construct 3p computer science and
> 3p-number theory in the same élan :)
>
> We need them in AUDA. The observational, the sensible, the epistemological,
> the doxastic, will be points of view made possible by the 3p separation
> between G and G*, which itself protects from collapsing the 3p (meta)
> classical modal definition of knowledge (which refer to a non definable
> notion of truth (God)).
>
> I am aware that at some point I will have to explain that very key
> meta-arithmetical fact. I mean the fact that []p is 3p describable, and that
> []p & p is not (despite the present appearance). "[]p & p" is more a non
> trivial (not even constructive) "mise en situation", "putting in a
> situation" of a machine ([]p) and a non nameable (by Tarski) God
> (truth('p')). We can prove that such a knower cannot be defined in
> arithmetic or in any universal machine language, but in arithmetic, the
> "mise en situation" is still real and independent of us. From the machine's
> point of view, the machine has a soul, which is not justifiably equivalent
> with any 3p object. The machine already knows that IF she is a machine, she
> cannot know which one she is, with "she" the first person self.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Jul 2014, at 14:19, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11 July 2014 19:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that
>>>>> reducing
>>>>> does not eliminate.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You are a little too quick here with your "everybody", since obviously
>>>> my whole point has been that I *don't* agree! I would remind you that,
>>>> in an earlier iteration of this argument with Peter Jones, you said
>>>> that 3p reductive explanation eliminates *ontologically*, but not
>>>> *epistemologically*. This, essentially, is the distinction I've been
>>>> insisting on.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The problem is that a pure 3p reduction does not eliminate a 3p notion,
>>> either, except for consciousness, due to the fact that it is a "pure 1p
>>> notion".
>>>
>>> It is not because I can explain prime number in terms of addition and
>>> multiplication, than prime number would not exist, that is why there is a
>>> whole 3p higher order 3p "science".
>>>
>>> But that 3p science is, (and it is there that we agree, and it is the key
>>> relevant point in the thread with Brent), is that no 3p reduction at all
>>> can
>>> be done for consciousness. The analogy brain/chess playing with
>>> machine/self-playing works without eliminating the chess player, but does
>>> eliminate the chess player consciousness if we limit ourself on that
>>> analogy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But we can't use that to compare consciousness/neurons
>>>>> to temperature/molecules-kinetic.
>>>>> In that later case we reduce a 3p high
>>>>> level to a 3p lower level. And indeed, this does not eliminate
>>>>> temperature.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, if you still hold to your earlier opinion, you should agree
>>>> that, in terms of an explanatory hierarchy based on an ontology of
>>>> molecular kinetics, temperature must be considered to have been
>>>> eliminated *ontologically* (i.e. to have been revealed as *nothing
>>>> more than* the underlying kinetics).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I can, and see what you mean, but I prefer not, because I am realist on
>>> the
>>> relations and higher 3p description too.
>>>
>>> Then I think it helps to single what is precisely difficult in
>>> consciousness
>>> which will be the modal difference, instead of a 3p higher description.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> However, it remains as a datum of
>>>> epistemology , i.e. as an "object" of knowledge, perception, or
>>>> cognition.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, but this will be related (not identified, with an important 3p "high
>>> notion" concept, like computation).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hence it can still be appealed to in explanation *in
>>>> general* as long as we don't forget the original distinction at some
>>>> later point in the argument when it begins to beg the question at
>>>> issue.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think we agree on the main thing.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But in the case of consciousness, we have consciousness which is 1p,
>>>>> and
>>>>> neurons which are 3p. Here, the whole 3p, be it the arithmetical or
>>>>> physical
>>>>> reality fails (when taken as a complete explanation). The higher level
>>>>> 1p
>>>>> notions are not just higher 3p description, it is the intimate non
>>>>> justifiable (and infinite) part of a person, which wonderfully enough
>>>>> provably becomes a non-machine, and a non nameable entity, when we
>>>>> apply
>>>>>>
>>>>>> the definition of Theaetetus definition to the machine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with all of this (indeed I've been arguing for it) but I think
>>>> that the ontology/epistemology distinction I've been attempting to
>>>> defend can be used to construct a reductio against the completeness,
>>>> or coherence, of any exclusively 3p explanatory hierarchy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. But with comp, the modalities and the Theaetetus definition provides
>>> an
>>> exclusively 3p explanatory entity (truth), which we can explain cannot be
>>> recognized as such from inside, making it impossible indeed to reduce the
>>> internal 1p to that transcendent 3p from inside.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> If so, this
>>>> may help to further clarify arguments against the compatibility of
>>>> physicalism and computationalism such as the MGA. The
>>>> ontology/epistemology distinction could also perhaps be seen as
>>>> noumenal/phenomenal.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I take it that way, but incompleteness adds nuances, and the literature.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> ISTM that 3p, in any explanatory strategy, is
>>>> noumenal in that it cannot be known directly but stands for whatever
>>>> is presumed to account for what we *can* and *do* know. So one might
>>>> say that physicalism is the attempt to construct a TOE entirely in
>>>> noumenal terms, "independent" of knowledge: a "view from nowhere".
>>>> ISTM that the problem this creates is exposed in at least two distinct
>>>> ways.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would not do that, because, without comp, physicalism could have
>>> succeeded.
>>> Comp leads to explains everything from such a view of nowhere, but it is
>>> more like the Outer God of the greek, it is the arithmetical reality
>>> (which
>>> already is not reducible to any finitely or recursively presentable
>>> theory).
>>> The 1p is defined by a link between the 3p believer and "God" (truth),
>>> which
>>> is unnameable by the creature.
>>>
>>> But this distinction could have work for physicalism, except that comp
>>> truncated the soul and distribute it on infinities of computation,
>>> leading
>>> to a reduction of the physical into an epistemological statistics on 1p
>>> experiences.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Firstly, it turns out that it is impossible FAPP to construct a
>>>> reductive explanation in wholly 3p terms. All such explanations rely
>>>> on levels of an explanatory hierarchy that are properly phenomenal in
>>>> terms of the putative explanatory noumenon, such as temperature with
>>>> respect to molecular kinetics. IOW, "temperature" is a phenomenon of
>>>> molecular kinetics, or to put in terms of epistemology/ontology,
>>>> temperature is what can be *known* with respect to molecular kinetics,
>>>> as distinct from an ontological *supplement* to that kinetics. Hence
>>>> it can be seen that an explanatory strategy that starts as an attempt
>>>> to explain "everything" in terms of a 3p or noumenal ontology can't
>>>> help but lay its sticky metaphysical fingers on properly phenomenal or
>>>> epistemological explananda. Should it then tacitly use such explananda
>>>> to *explain themselves* (as I argue in the case of
>>>> computation-consciousness under physicalist assumptions) it cannot
>>>> help but place itself in a viciously circular explanatory bind.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. Eventually the physical "3p" will be "reduced" to first person plural
>>> machine's experience. But in some context, in the course of the argument,
>>> we
>>> can use 3p for the physical, as a good approximation. Of course, for
>>> someone more advanced, the weakness can be seen, but is not I thin
>>> relevant.
>>>
>>> looking at atoms and kinetics as 3p things, and at temperature as high
>>> level
>>> 3p things, with some ontology, helps to see that the high level 3p things
>>> is
>>> not yet an 1p object (even if latter most will be, like the physical
>>> reality).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> OK, one may respond, let's redeem the viciousness of the circularity
>>>> by explicitly abandoning the phenomenal or epistemological explananda.
>>>> Who needs 'em, after all, ex hypothesi, the 3p basement-level
>>>> explanatory machinery is supposed to "work by itself", isn't it? But
>>>> this immediately exposes the second, or complementary, problem in any
>>>> purely 3p explanatory strategy. Although we can still refer to an
>>>> ontological schema that is, in principle, complete (I mean, everything
>>>> could be "just the wave function", couldn't it?)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Only if it solve the comp measure problem, or it eliminate consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> we have now abandoned
>>>> that schema entirely to the noumenal. And nothing in the noumenal
>>>> explanatory basement can ever be knowable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> So it is at this point its
>>>> seeming "completeness" becomes really worrying, because it tends in
>>>> the direction of the elimination of phenomena tout court. This would
>>>> surely be to argue for "zombie existence" in a peculiarly radical way,
>>>> in that the zombie, or indeed any separable entity, is now not merely
>>>> unknowing but unknowable (i.e. non-phenomenal).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. But comp guaranties a realm-completeness (no need of more than 0,
>>> s(0),
>>> etc.). yet it gives a vaccine against all possible 3p reduction of the
>>> "view
>>> from inside" arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Obviously, if comp is to avoid the same criticism, we must be able to
>>>> show that it isn't prone to the same inherent deficiencies. IIUC, the
>>>> 3p or noumenal level of explanation in comp isn't exactly number
>>>> relations simpliciter, but rather computation *as emulated by* some
>>>> minimal first-order combinatorial ontology (such as RA).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, you need 0, s(0), etc. + the laws of addition and multiplication.
>>> But
>>> that is apparently similar to taking some particles and some forces. the
>>> point is that physics is independent of the choise of the base ontology,
>>> as
>>> the physical becomes an internal modalities of the big outer 3p thing.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> FAPP, in
>>>> terms of the comp explanatory strategy, this comes to be represented
>>>> by the infinite trace of the UD. It might, I guess, be arguable that
>>>> computation is a "phenomenon" of arithmetic, but certainly not in any
>>>> straightforwardly hierarchical sense analogous to, say,
>>>> temperature/molecular kinetics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why not. All that is 3p. Computations can be provided to exist, like
>>> prime
>>> numbers, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Whatever the nuances, computation -
>>>> and in particular its self-referential sub-class - is the singular
>>>> "phenomenon" explicitly relied on in the noumenal explanatory
>>>> basement. From this point forward the explanatory strategy necessarily
>>>> shifts from the noumenal "view from nowhere" to the epistemological
>>>> "view from everywhere"; or from 3p to 1p (plural).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We get that by incompleteness, through the nuance between []p, []p &
>>> <>p,
>>> []p & p, []p & <>p & p, on p sigma_1 (the UD* restriction).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is to say, all "phenomena" must from here on be justified by
>>>> reference to *explicitly knowable* modalities of logic and truth,
>>>> filtered from the computational everything, by the competing points of
>>>> view of its "noumenal machinery". Consequently physics - and in
>>>> particular its proprietary reductive hierarchy of explanation - is no
>>>> longer posited at the unknowable, 3p or noumenal level, but rather
>>>> entirely and exclusively at the knowable, phenomenal or 1p-plural
>>>> level, where it must appear both in its formal (reducible) and
>>>> informal (irreducible) guises. This crucial "yin-yang" nuance is what
>>>> points to a possible resolution of the "apparently inner" with the
>>>> "apparently outer", aka the paradox of phenomenal judgement, or more
>>>> simply the mind-body problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. I think.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11 Jul 2014, at 09:41, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11 July 2014 00:54, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I understand the MGA it assumes physicalism and then purports to
>>>>>>> show
>>>>>>> that computation still exists with minimal or zero physical activity
>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> evaucates the physics and keeps the computation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For heaven's sake, Brent! This is what you originally said to Liz.
>>>>>> What you're referring to is Maudlin's argument. It's the *opposite* of
>>>>>> my understanding of the MGA, which seeks to show how physical action
>>>>>> can be preserved unchanged even in cases where the original
>>>>>> "computational relations" have been completely disrupted. I spent
>>>>>> several paragraphs describing this with additional examples. You then
>>>>>> commented this with "I agree with all you wrote", which led to some
>>>>>> further discussion based (as I thought) on this understanding.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Your comment above now leaves me hopelessly confused. I would be
>>>>>> grateful if you would review our recent discussion and clarify what
>>>>>> you do or do not agree with in my analysis.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that it will help to define perhaps more precisely what is a
>>>>> computation.
>>>>>
>>>>> I will reread the thread (many posts) when I have more time, and make
>>>>> only
>>>>> one comment.
>>>>>
>>>>> We have a computation when a universal machine compute something. We
>>>>> have
>>>>> an
>>>>> intensional Post-Church thesis 'which follows from the usual
>>>>> Post-Church-Turing thesis), which makes possible to translate
>>>>> "universal
>>>>> machine compute something" in term of numbers addition and
>>>>> multiplication
>>>>> +
>>>>> one existential quantifier.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, when are two computations the same? If we fix a base phi_i, we
>>>>> might
>>>>> define a computations by sequences of step of the universal base
>>>>> computing
>>>>> some phi_k, that is the nth steps phi_k(j)^n of the computation by the
>>>>> base
>>>>> of the program k on the input j, with n = 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> But now that very computation will recure infinitely often, and not
>>>>> always
>>>>> in (algorithmically) recognizable way.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can conceive it might not be obvious that the evolution of a game
>>>>> of
>>>>> life pattern (GOL is Turing-universal) is simulating a Fortran
>>>>> interpreter
>>>>> simulating a Lisp program computing the ph(j)^n above.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is exactly why our computations, with and without (and in between)
>>>>> their environment (with and without oracles) recurre infinitely often
>>>>> in
>>>>> the
>>>>> sigma_1 truth (UD*).
>>>>>
>>>>> So two computations can be the same at some level of description, and
>>>>> yet
>>>>> occurs in quite different "places" in the UD*.
>>>>>
>>>>> Comp says that there is a level of description of myself such that
>>>>> those
>>>>> computation *at the correct level" "carries my consciousness".
>>>>>
>>>>> But Brent, and Peter Jones, adds that the computation have to be done
>>>>> by
>>>>> a
>>>>> "real thing".
>>>>> This is a bit like either choosing some particular universal number pr,
>>>>> and
>>>>> called it "physical reality", and add the axioms that only the phi_pr
>>>>> computations counts: the phi_pr (j)^n.
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, this would just select (without argument) a special sub-universal
>>>>> dovetailing among (any) universal dovetailing. The only "force" here is
>>>>> that
>>>>> somehow the quantum Everet wave, seen as such a phi_pr do solve the
>>>>> measure
>>>>> problem (accepting Gleason theorem does its job).
>>>>>
>>>>> But just choosing that phi_pr does not solve the mind-body problem,
>>>>> only
>>>>> the
>>>>> body problem in a superficial way (losing the non justifiable parts
>>>>> notably).
>>>>>
>>>>> Or they make that physical reality non computable (as comp needs, but
>>>>> they
>>>>> conjecture that it differs from the non (entirely) computable physics
>>>>> that
>>>>> we can extract from arithmetic (with comp). But then it is just a
>>>>> statement
>>>>> like "your plane will not fly". Let us make the test, and up to now it
>>>>> works.
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree with Brent, and I think everybody agree, when he says that
>>>>> reducing
>>>>> does not eliminate. But we can't use that to compare
>>>>> consciousness/neurons
>>>>> to temperature/molecules-kinetic. In that later case we reduce a 3p
>>>>> high
>>>>> level to a 3p lower level. And indeed, this does not eliminate
>>>>> temperature.
>>>>> But in the case of consciousness, we have consciousness which is 1p,
>>>>> and
>>>>> neurons which are 3p. Here, the whole 3p, be it the arithmetical or
>>>>> physical
>>>>> reality fails (when taken as a complete explanation). The higher level
>>>>> 1p
>>>>> notions are not just higher 3p description, it is the intimate non
>>>>> justifiable (and infinite) part of a person, which wonderfully enough
>>>>> provably becomes a non-machine, and a non nameable entity, when we
>>>>> apply
>>>>> the
>>>>> definition of Theaetetus definition to the machine.
>>>>>
>>>>> Interesting! We are at the crux of the crux! I see that Gerson(*)
>>>>> follows
>>>>> Socrates, and take the Theaetetus definition ([]p & p) as a
>>>>> "description"
>>>>> of
>>>>> knowledge, but the universal machine can understand that this is not
>>>>> true
>>>>> when applied on machine (ironically enough). The modal "[]p & p" can
>>>>> define
>>>>> knowledge without providing any description or code. "Worst" (but this
>>>>> is
>>>>> why this strategy works!), not only "[]p & p" definition does not
>>>>> provide
>>>>> a
>>>>> description of the knower, but it is constructively immune against all
>>>>> descriptions. The apparently little inner god, is a god from his own
>>>>> first
>>>>> person view, that here, he share with the outer god. (if machine and
>>>>> self-referentially correct).
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>> (*)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Ancient-Epistemology-Key-Themes-Philosophy/dp/0521871395
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
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