On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 2:04 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 27 July 2014 18:46, Jesse Mazer <[email protected]> wrote: > > > But when you say "by this point in the argument", do you mean there was > > some > > earlier step that established some good *reasons* for why we should > abandon > > the notion of a "primitively-physical universe" (or primitive universal > > computation), or is it just something that was posited at some point for > the > > purposes of exploring the consequences, without any claim that this posit > > was implied by earlier steps in the argument? > > No, it is the strong implication of Step 7 on the basis of Steps 0-6, > Well, this is precisely what I'm asking about, I don't see why abandoning the notion of a primitive universal computation is *implied* by anything that comes in steps 0-6, even after reading Bruno's "Comp (2013)" paper. Do you see any way in which the hypothesis I've suggested, which assigns measure to various sub-computations based on their frequency within a single universal computation U, contradicts anything in steps 0-6? I'm still identifying each observer-moment with one of those sub-computations, and saying the subjective probabilities of various possible "next moments" should depend on their measure (perhaps combined with some kind of "informational continuity", since I'm presumably not going to experience becoming a brain-pattern with a totally different set of memories and personality, even if that brain-pattern has a high measure of its own), not on any sort of physical continuity. > and the only option available after Step 8, But again, why? What about step 8 contradicts the hypothesis I've suggested? Bruno seemed to agree in previous discussion that a simulated world containing a movie-graph version of me would *not* "contain" my program in the "isomorphic logical structure" sense I discussed, whereas a simulated world containing a simulated physical computer running my program would. >> and while it might seem plausible initially >> I think it becomes less so when you think more carefully about how measure >> might actually be assigned. Do you disagree that if we use the particular >> definition of measure I suggest, in the example I gave with U and U' (both >> containing a universal dovetailer alongside a bunch of other computers >> churning out endless copies of me in Washington or me in Moscow) the UD >> will >> *not* dominate the "measure competition", in that U and U' will give very >> different answers to the relative likelihood that I find myself in >> Washington vs. Moscow in Bruno's thought-experiment? >Well, a "bunch of other computers" still seems to assume something >more primitive than the simple assumption of arithmetic for the >ontology. In terms of the UDA, all "bunches of computers" are already >subsumed within the infinite redundancy of UD*. Again I am asking about the logic that explains *why* we should abandon the notion of a "primitive universal computation" given that we agree with steps 1-6. I thought when you said the UD would dominate, you were trying to give an argument for why any notion of a "primitive universal computation" would somehow become irrelevant to determining measure as long as we assume it contains an eternally-running UD (which if true would certainly be a good argument for abandoning the primitive universal computation as an irrelevant hypothesis, like the argument for abandoning an absolute reference frame in relativity because even if it existed it would have no measurable consequences). Maybe I misunderstood you, though. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
