On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 6:17 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 8/11/2014 9:27 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 12 August 2014 15:50, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 8/11/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum >> uncertainty, like all computers, but why do we need to assume QM apply? >> >> The argument assumes it doesn't apply, so that the computation can be >> deterministic. I don't know that it affects the argument, but worries me a >> little that we make this unrealistic assumption; especially if we have >> include a whole 'world context' for the MG simulation. >> > > Ah, I see. One of the assumptions of comp is that consciousness is a > classical computation. At least I think that's what it means to say that > the Church-Turing thesis applies. I suppose a question here is whether QM > can introduce some "magic" that allows it to create consciousness from a > purely materialistic basis. If so then there's no need for comp because > consciousness isn't classically emulable....yes? > > > Although a quantum computer can compute some things much faster than a > classical computer, it still can't compute things that are Turing > uncomputable, so I don't think it provides that kind of magic. I was > thinking more of the fact that the recorded inputs to B and the response to > the projection of the movie onto the graph will not be perfectly > deterministic, but only with high statistical probability. Also, in QM it > generally makes a difference to the evolution of the system whether other > states are available even if they are never occupied. > > > This is what I don't see. Why do A's internal processes have >>> meaning, while B's don't - given that they're physically identical? >>> >> B's have meaning too, but it is derivative meaning because the >> meanings are copies of A's and A's refer to a world. So it's an >> unwarranted conclusion to say, see B is conscious and there's no physics >> going on. There's plenty of physics going on in the past that causally >> connects B to A's experience. Just because it's not going on at the moment >> B is supposed to be experiencing it isn't determinative. Real QM physics >> can require counterfactual correctness in the past (e.g. Wheeler's quantum >> erasure, Elitzur and Dolev's quantum liar's paradox). >> > > Well, as I've mentioned previously I think time symmetry may sort out > those awkward retroactive quantum measurements. But anyway, I guess this is > putting the schrodinger's cat before the horse, in that comp only assumes > classical computation and attempts to derive a quantum world from it. So I > guess we can't necessarily assume real QM physics, or at least not unless > we've shown comp to be based on false premises or internally inconsistent, > or have a rival theory of consciousness arising naturally from qm and > materialism, or some other good reason to do so. I think what I'm trying to > say here is that to assume comp must work with real physics is to assume > from the start that there is no reversal. > > > Well there's also the question of whether comp and the UD solve the hard > problem any better than psychophysical parallelism. > I'm not sure that comp and UD propose to solve the hard problem, as much as proposing why it's not solvable. > Pierz did a good job of examining this and I made some comments on his > post. I would like to look at comp+UD as just another scientific > hypothesis which we will adopt when it makes some surprising prediction > which is proved out by tests. Obviously getting some surprising, trestable > prediction out of it is likely to be very difficulty. But unlike Bruno I'm > not much persuaded by logical inference from logic, Church-Turing, or Peano > arithmetic because I think they aren't "The Truth" but just models we use > in our thinking. Just reflect on how all logicians and philosophers would > have said, "No object can be in two different places at the same time. It's > just logic." - before quantum mechanics. > It is my impression that progress in logic is done by removing all that is non-abstract. It's a simplification effort. My difficulties with logic usually arise from not being able to grasp the counter-intuitive simple level at which it operates. Confusing common sense with logic is a common mistake. You see this a lot on you tube these days, where well-meaning atheists like to say "it's just logic" when they are in fact referring to scientific common sense. I am an atheist, an agnostic and a lover of science, so I never like this -- it's resorting to the tricks of the "enemy". > > > I'm not sure I follow you here. Why does making the simulation >> bigger invalidate the argument? Is there a cut-off point? >> >> I don't know about a cut-off. The argument is a reductio. The >> conclusion Bruno makes is that no physical process is necessary to support >> consciousness, >> > > OK > > >> consciousness can be instantiated in a Turing machine simulation. >> > > Sorry to split the sentence, but I must admit I thought that latter part > was his initial assumption, rather than his conclusion? > > > The initial assumption is consciousness can be instantiated by a physical > computation (one that replicates the I/O of your neurons), but step 8 is to > show it must be independent of the physical computation and can be > instantiated by an abstraction. > > > > >> But my argument is that the simulation must also simulate a world that >> the consciousness interacts with, is conscious *of*, that a physical world >> is necessary for consciousness. If it's a simulated consciousness, then it >> can be a simulated physics but it has to be some physics. >> > > Right, yes, I see. Or I think I see. That's implying that the comp > argument is assuming what it sets out to show, that is, it sets out to show > that physics can be derived from consciousness as computation, but if it > has to introduce physics to show this, then the argument has become > circular. So if interactions with an environment are necessary for > consciousness to exist (as part of the definition of consciousness) then > the argument is necessarily circular. The question is whether the > interaction is necessary, or incidental - "incidental" would mean that > consciousness has arisen in a physical world through evolution, and hence > is highly specialised as an agent interacting with that world, but it could > at least in theory arise some other way (e.g. inside a computer). Although > it's hard to imagine how any conscious being could learn anything useful > without interacting with some sort of world - it would sure be a blank > slate otherwise. So I guess the question boils down to: is a blank slate > consciousness - one that isn't aware of anything (except its own existence, > I guess) possible? > > > It is in Bruno's conception. It is MOST conscious because it can go > anywhere from there, be anybody or any being. That's why he thinks > intelligence, which he deprecates as mere "competence", detracts from > consciousness. It has narrowed or directed consciousness. As you can see > that is quite different from my idea of consciousness as something that > arose as a way for evolution to take advantage of perception mechanisms in > doing learning, prediction, and planning. I think consciousness is a > certain kind of thought and it's about something. Bruno thinks it's a > mystic property of relations between computations, e.g. being provable. > In a more naive way, I arrived at the same conclusion before reading Bruno: that intelligence and consciousness are different things. I did it through introspection. I know highly intelligent people that think like you. I know I am being honest and I fully believe you are being honest too, so I see this divergence as part of the mystery, that merits investigation. > > > Or to put it yet another way, is Descartes right that "je pense donc je > suis" or isn't that enough? > > Which I have to admit I don't know the answer to. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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