On 12 Aug 2014, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 6:17 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/11/2014 9:27 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 August 2014 15:50, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/11/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum
uncertainty, like all computers, but why do we need to assume QM
apply?
The argument assumes it doesn't apply, so that the computation can
be deterministic. I don't know that it affects the argument, but
worries me a little that we make this unrealistic
assumption; especially if we have include a whole
'world context' for the MG simulation.
Ah, I see. One of the assumptions of comp is that consciousness is
a classical computation. At least I think that's what it means to
say that the Church-Turing thesis applies. I suppose a question
here is whether QM can introduce some "magic" that allows it to
create consciousness from a purely materialistic basis. If so then
there's no need for comp because consciousness isn't classically
emulable....yes?
Although a quantum computer can compute some things much faster than
a classical computer, it still can't compute things that are Turing
uncomputable, so I don't think it provides that kind of magic. I
was thinking more of the fact that the recorded inputs to B and the
response to the projection of the movie onto the graph will not be
perfectly deterministic, but only with high statistical
probability. Also, in QM it generally makes a difference to the
evolution of the system whether other states are available even if
they are never occupied.
This is what I don't see. Why do A's internal processes have
meaning, while B's don't - given that they're physically identical?
B's have meaning too, but it is derivative meaning because the
meanings are copies of A's and A's refer to a world. So it's an
unwarranted conclusion to say, see B is conscious and there's no
physics going on. There's plenty of physics going on in the past
that causally connects B to A's experience. Just because it's not
going on at the moment B is supposed to be experiencing it isn't
determinative. Real QM physics can require counterfactual
correctness in the past (e.g. Wheeler's quantum erasure, Elitzur
and Dolev's quantum liar's paradox).
Well, as I've mentioned previously I think time symmetry may sort
out those awkward retroactive quantum measurements. But anyway, I
guess this is putting the schrodinger's cat before the horse, in
that comp only assumes classical computation and attempts to derive
a quantum world from it. So I guess we can't necessarily assume
real QM physics, or at least not unless we've shown comp to be
based on false premises or internally inconsistent, or have a rival
theory of consciousness arising naturally from qm and materialism,
or some other good reason to do so. I think what I'm trying to say
here is that to assume comp must work with real physics is to
assume from the start that there is no reversal.
Well there's also the question of whether comp and the UD solve the
hard problem any better than psychophysical parallelism.
I'm not sure that comp and UD propose to solve the hard problem, as
much as proposing why it's not solvable.
Well, it is mainly the AUDA which shows that it is not solvable.
The UDA does not solve any problem. It provides a new problem. It
assumes computationalism, and derive a problem for matter. UDA just
shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult with
comp, as it can no more take matter for granted.
But AUDA arguably solves, or meta-solves the mind-body problem, by
providing a theory of mind and consciousness (mainly by the logics of
[]p and []p & p), and it does provide a theory of matter (taken now in
the UD sense, i.e. a measure on computations), and this mainly by the
logics of []p & <>p and []p & <>p & p.
Pierz did a good job of examining this and I made some comments on
his post. I would like to look at comp+UD as just another
scientific hypothesis which we will adopt when it makes some
surprising prediction which is proved out by tests. Obviously
getting some surprising, trestable prediction out of it is likely to
be very difficulty. But unlike Bruno I'm not much persuaded by
logical inference from logic, Church-Turing, or Peano arithmetic
because I think they aren't "The Truth" but just models we use in
our thinking. Just reflect on how all logicians and philosophers
would have said, "No object can be in two different places at the
same time. It's just logic." - before quantum mechanics.
It is my impression that progress in logic is done by removing all
that is non-abstract. It's a simplification effort. My difficulties
with logic usually arise from not being able to grasp the counter-
intuitive simple level at which it operates. Confusing common sense
with logic is a common mistake. You see this a lot on you tube these
days, where well-meaning atheists like to say "it's just logic" when
they are in fact referring to scientific common sense. I am an
atheist, an agnostic and a lover of science, so I never like this --
it's resorting to the tricks of the "enemy".
I'm not sure I follow you here. Why does making the simulation
bigger invalidate the argument? Is there a cut-off point?
I don't know about a cut-off. The argument is a reductio. The
conclusion Bruno makes is that no physical process
is necessary to support consciousness,
OK
consciousness can be instantiated in a Turing machine simulation.
Sorry to split the sentence, but I must admit I thought that latter
part was his initial assumption, rather than his conclusion?
The initial assumption is consciousness can be instantiated by a
physical computation (one that replicates the I/O of your neurons),
but step 8 is to show it must be independent of the physical
computation and can be instantiated by an abstraction.
But my argument is that the simulation must also simulate a world
that the consciousness interacts with, is conscious *of*, that a
physical world is necessary for consciousness. If it's a simulated
consciousness, then it can be a simulated physics but it has to be
some physics.
Right, yes, I see. Or I think I see. That's implying that the comp
argument is assuming what it sets out to show, that is, it sets out
to show that physics can be derived from consciousness as
computation, but if it has to introduce physics to show this, then
the argument has become circular. So if interactions with an
environment are necessary for consciousness to exist (as part of
the definition of consciousness) then the argument is necessarily
circular. The question is whether the interaction is
necessary, or incidental - "incidental" would mean that
consciousness has arisen in a physical world through evolution, and
hence is highly specialised as an agent interacting with that
world, but it could at least in theory arise some other way (e.g.
inside a computer). Although it's hard to imagine how any conscious
being could learn anything useful without interacting with some
sort of world - it would sure be a blank slate otherwise. So I
guess the question boils down to: is a blank slate consciousness -
one that isn't aware of anything (except its own existence, I
guess) possible?
It is in Bruno's conception. It is MOST conscious because it can go
anywhere from there, be anybody or any being. That's why he thinks
intelligence, which he deprecates as mere "competence", detracts
from consciousness. It has narrowed or directed consciousness. As
you can see that is quite different from my idea of consciousness as
something that arose as a way for evolution to take advantage of
perception mechanisms in doing learning, prediction, and planning.
I think consciousness is a certain kind of thought and it's about
something. Bruno thinks it's a mystic property of relations between
computations, e.g. being provable.
In a more naive way, I arrived at the same conclusion before reading
Bruno: that intelligence and consciousness are different things. I
did it through introspection. I know highly intelligent people that
think like you. I know I am being honest and I fully believe you are
being honest too, so I see this divergence as part of the mystery,
that merits investigation.
The "mysticism" is a by-product of the Gödel-Solovay G/G* separation.
It is the fact that machines cannot avoid the discovery that truth
(god) extends a lot "proofs, 3p-science, justification, etc. It is
related to what Gödel saw: the fact that machines can effectuate the
diagonalization on themselves and understand/prove that if there is a
reality/truth then she cannot prove it. The machine can bet that there
is a reality, and can be compelled to do so (to survive), and yet know
that in that case, she cannot justify it in the 3p manner.
Note that by the completeness theorem, the formula <>t, that is ~[]f,
is equivalent with there is a reality satisfying my belief. As long as
a proof system is effective enough, it obeys to that completeness
theorem (Gödel 1930, not Gödel 1931 (IN-completeness).
Bruno
Or to put it yet another way, is Descartes right that "je pense
donc je suis" or isn't that enough?
Which I have to admit I don't know the answer to.
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