On 12 Aug 2014, at 18:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/12/2014 2:08 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 August 2014 17:17, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/11/2014 9:27 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 August 2014 15:50, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/11/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum
uncertainty, like all computers, but why do we need to assume QM
apply?
The argument assumes it doesn't apply, so that the computation can
be deterministic. I don't know that it affects the argument, but
worries me a little that we make this unrealistic assumption;
especially if we have include a whole 'world context' for the MG
simulation.
Ah, I see. One of the assumptions of comp is that consciousness is
a classical computation. At least I think that's what it means to
say that the Church-Turing thesis applies. I suppose a question
here is whether QM can introduce some "magic" that allows it to
create consciousness from a purely materialistic basis. If so then
there's no need for comp because consciousness isn't classically
emulable....yes?
Although a quantum computer can compute some things much faster
than a classical computer, it still can't compute things that are
Turing uncomputable, so I don't think it provides that kind of
magic. I was thinking more of the fact that the recorded inputs to
B and the response to the projection of the movie onto the graph
will not be perfectly deterministic, but only with high statistical
probability. Also, in QM it generally makes a difference to the
evolution of the system whether other states are available even if
they are never occupied.
OK, I think I follow. This would appear to assume that physics
precedes computation, in an explanatory sense, which I would say
means it probably assumes comp is false as a premise?
There I agree with JKC. "Comp" is ambiguous.
Well, certainly not for the same reason. JKC has no problem with steps
0, 1, 2. By definition of comp, this means he has no problem with comp.
If it's just that it would be a good bet to have the doctor replace
some brain parts with I/O functionally identical parts, then no that
is not assumed false. But Bruno claims that the whole argument,
through step 8, follows from "comp", which I doubt. The problem is
that it's a reductio ad absurdum. When your argument reaches an
absurdity then it implies something in the chain of inference is
wrong. But it isn't necessarily the main premise you started with;
it can be a mistake anywhere along the way.
OK, but then you need to find the flaw. UDA1-7 is purely deductive.
careful as step 8, MGA, is not a purely deductive argument, as it
point to "reality", so it is just an argument showing that when
primitive matter is used to block the consequence of UDA1-7, it is
equivalent to an introduction of something magic (primitive matter) to
avoid ... its own testability (modulo the idea that we might be
dreaming or already in a special but normal (in the statistical sense
on all computations) emulation, à-la Galouye or Bostrom.
Well there's also the question of whether comp and the UD solve the
hard problem any better than psychophysical parallelism.
Yes indeed, I haven't really got to grips with that. I think the
only way in which comp tries to tackle the hard problem is
(something to do with) the fact that an infinite number of
computations are involved. I must admit I have great difficulty
even thinking about the hard problem, my tendency is to dismiss it
as either "too mystical" or "too nonexistent". But I do feel there
is an ineffable quality to consciousness. (Or is the word
numinous?) On days which start with a 'T', at least.
Pierz did a good job of examining this and I made some comments on
his post. I would like to look at comp+UD as just another
scientific hypothesis which we will adopt when it makes some
surprising prediction which is proved out by tests. Obviously
getting some surprising, testable prediction out of it is likely to
be very difficulty.
Yes.
(I suppose if one didn't have experience of consciousness,
predictions of incommunicable qualia and so on might be
surprising...if something that didn't have experience of
consciousness could be surprised, at least. But yes,)
But unlike Bruno I'm not much persuaded by logical inference from
logic, Church-Turing, or Peano arithmetic because I think they
aren't "The Truth" but just models we use in our thinking. Just
reflect on how all logicians and philosophers would have said, "No
object can be in two different places at the same time. It's just
logic." - before quantum mechanics.
And indeed physicists. Although does QM say unequivocally that an
electron, say, can be in two places at the same time, or does that
depend on the model? (I know the wave function can be in lots of
places at the same time, of course).
I don't know about a cut-off. The argument is a reductio. The
conclusion Bruno makes is that no physical process is necessary to
support consciousness,
OK
consciousness can be instantiated in a Turing machine simulation.
Sorry to split the sentence, but I must admit I thought that
latter part was his initial assumption, rather than his conclusion?
The initial assumption is consciousness can be instantiated by a
physical computation (one that replicates the I/O of your neurons),
but step 8 is to show it must be independent of the physical
computation and can be instantiated by an abstraction.
Yes. I'm only quibbling here, but I think you only need the bit
before the comma to make your point. (I think the part after the
comma comes into his argument at about step 6?).
So I guess the question boils down to: is a blank slate
consciousness - one that isn't aware of anything (except its own
existence, I guess) possible?
It is in Bruno's conception. It is MOST conscious because it can
go anywhere from there, be anybody or any being. That's why he
thinks intelligence, which he deprecates as mere "competence",
detracts from consciousness. It has narrowed or directed
consciousness. As you can see that is quite different from my idea
of consciousness as something that arose as a way for evolution to
take advantage of perception mechanisms in doing learning,
prediction, and planning. I think consciousness is
a certain kind of thought and it's about something. Bruno thinks
it's a mystic property of relations between computations, e.g.
being provable.
Does Bruno actually say what he thinks consciousness is? (This is
probably somewhere beyond the MGA, which is where I tend to get
stuck...)
When I've asked directly what it would take to make a robot
conscious, he's said Lobianity. Essentially it's the ability to do
proofs by mathematical induction and prove Godel's theorem. But
"ability" seems to be just in the sense of potential, as a Turing
machine has the ability to compute anything computable.
That is what you need for your robot being able to be conscious. OK.
But to be conscious, you need not just the machine/man, but some
connection with god/truth.
To put is roughly the believer []p is never conscious, it is the
knower []p & p who is conscious. It is very different: []p can be
defined in arithmetic. []p & p cannot be defined in arithmetic, or in
the machine's language.
Bruno
Brent
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