On 8/11/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 August 2014 15:12, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
A makes decisions in response to the world. Although, ex hypothesi, the
world is
repeating its inputs and A is repeating his decisions.
(I assume you mean B is repeating?)
Sorry, right I meant B.
Note that this assumes QM doesn't apply at the computational level of A.
Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum uncertainty, like all
computers, but why do we need to assume QM apply?
The argument assumes it doesn't apply, so that the computation can be deterministic. I
don't know that it affects the argument, but worries me a little that we make this
unrealistic assumption; especially if we have include a whole 'world context' for the MG
simulation.
In the argument we're asked to consider a dream so that we're led to
overlook the
fact that the meaning of A's internal processes actually derive from A's
interaction
with a world.
This is what I don't see. Why do A's internal processes have meaning, while B's don't -
given that they're physically identical?
B's have meaning too, but it is derivative meaning because the meanings are copies of A's
and A's refer to a world. So it's an unwarranted conclusion to say, see B is conscious
and there's no physics going on. There's plenty of physics going on in the past that
causally connects B to A's experience. Just because it's not going on at the moment B is
supposed to be experiencing it isn't determinative. Real QM physics can require
counterfactual correctness in the past (e.g. Wheeler's quantum erasure, Elitzur and
Dolev's quantum liar's paradox).
Or at least I remember Bruno saying that the substitution level and region
to be
emulated weren't important to the argument, as long as there is some level
and
region in which it holds. I'm sure he said that it might involve emulating
the
world, or a chunk of the universe, but that the argument still goes through.
Or did I misremember that, or did he say that, but there's a flaw in his
argument?
It's not exactly a flaw. He always says, sure just make the simulation more
comprehensive, include more of the environment, even the whole universe.
Which is
OK, but then when you think about the reversal of physics and psychology
you see
that it is the physics here, in the non-simulated world, which has been
replaced by
the psychology PLUS physics in the simulated world. If I say I can replace
you with
a simulation - I'll probably be greeted with skepticism. But if I say I
can replace
you with a simulation of you in a simulation of the world - well then it's
not so
clear what I mean or how hard it will be.
I'm not sure I follow you here. Why does making the simulation bigger invalidate the
argument? Is there a cut-off point?
I don't know about a cut-off. The argument is a reductio. The conclusion Bruno makes is
that no physical process is necessary to support consciousness, consciousness can be
instantiated in a Turing machine simulation. But my argument is that the simulation must
also simulate a world that the consciousness interacts with, is conscious *of*, that a
physical world is necessary for consciousness. If it's a simulated consciousness, then it
can be a simulated physics but it has to be some physics.
Brent
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