On 12 August 2014 15:12, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > A makes decisions in response to the world. Although, ex hypothesi, the > world is repeating its inputs and A is repeating his decisions. >
(I assume you mean B is repeating?) > Note that this assumes QM doesn't apply at the computational level of A. > Well, I guess a physical UD would be made robust against quantum uncertainty, like all computers, but why do we need to assume QM apply? > In the argument we're asked to consider a dream so that we're led to > overlook the fact that the meaning of A's internal processes actually > derive from A's interaction with a world. > This is what I don't see. Why do A's internal processes have meaning, while B's don't - given that they're physically identical? > Or at least I remember Bruno saying that the substitution level and region > to be emulated weren't important to the argument, as long as there is some > level and region in which it holds. I'm sure he said that it might involve > emulating the world, or a chunk of the universe, but that the argument > still goes through. > > Or did I misremember that, or did he say that, but there's a flaw in his > argument? > > It's not exactly a flaw. He always says, sure just make the simulation > more comprehensive, include more of the environment, even the whole > universe. Which is OK, but then when you think about the reversal of > physics and psychology you see that it is the physics here, in the > non-simulated world, which has been replaced by the psychology PLUS physics > in the simulated world. If I say I can replace you with a simulation - > I'll probably be greeted with skepticism. But if I say I can replace you > with a simulation of you in a simulation of the world - well then it's not > so clear what I mean or how hard it will be. > I'm not sure I follow you here. Why does making the simulation bigger invalidate the argument? Is there a cut-off point? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
