On 15 August 2014 09:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/14/2014 11:40 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > Then it'd be no problem for you guys to clearly spell out what that > environment is. > > Yes, that's a problem. The MGA considers a computational sequence that > produces some conscious thought. I think that in order for the > computational sequence to have meaning it must refer to some context in > which decision or action is possible. That's what makes it about something > and not just a sequence of events. I initially thought of it in terms of > the extra states that had to be available for counterfactual correctness in > response to an external environment, e.g. seeing something, having a K_40 > atom decay in your brain. But now I've think the necessity of reference is > different than counterfactual correctness. For example if you had a > recording of the computations of an autonomous Mars Rover they wouldn't > really constitute a computation because the recording would not have the > possibility of branching in response to inputs. And the inputs wouldn't > necessarily be external, at a different state of the Rover's learning the > same sequence might have triggered a different association from memory. So > the referents are not necessarily just external, they include all of memory > as well. >
Given that comp assumes consciousness supervenes on classical computation, it's still hard for me to imagine what the difference is that counterfactuals or meaning supply. That is, a classical computation (as opposed to a quantum one...perhaps???) is a well-defined set of steps, and if you re-run them in the MGA they're identical. There may be no possibility of reacting differently to different inputs, but I can't see what difference - i.e. what real, physical, engineering (etc) type difference that makes. If consciousness is digitally emulable, then it can be replayed, and whatever "counterfactuals" and "meanings" that the consciousness may attach to its internal states or (replayed) inputs will be repeated. So in a nutshell I can't see how, assuming consciousness supervenes on physical computation, that "being about something" or having "meaning" or "needing counterfactual correctness" -- or needing a real environment, for that matter, as opposed to identically repeated inputs -- can make any difference to whether the UTM in question is conscious. Because a system that interacts with an environment and one that replays that interaction exactly are, or can in theory be made, physically identical. What am I missing? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
