Le 15 août 2014 06:41, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit :
>
> On 8/14/2014 8:32 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 14, 2014 at 08:12:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> That does seem strange, but I don't know that it strikes me as
>>> *absurd*.  Isn't it clearer that a recording is not a computation?
>>> And so if consciousness supervened on a recording it would prove
>>> that consciousness did not require computation?
>>>
>> To be precise "supervening on the playback of a recording". Playback
>> of a recording _is_ a computation too, just a rather simple one.
>>
>> In other words:
>>
>> #include <stdio.h>
>> int main()
>> {
>>    printf("hello world!\n");
>>    return 1;
>> }
>>
>> is very much a computer program (and a playback of recording of the
>> words "hello world" when run). I could change "hello world" to the
contents of
>> Wikipedia, to illustrate the point more forcibly.
>
> OK.  So do you think consciousness supervenes on such a simple
computation - one that's functionally identical with a recording?

I think it does... as it does on a giant lookup table. But as it is in fact
supervening on *all* computations going through the same states and not on
this or that precise computation,  it's not a problem.

Quentin

Or does instantiating consciousness require some degree of complexity such
that CC comes into play?
>
> What do you think of the requirement that consciousness (and the
computation on which it supervenes) have some causal reference to
environment to give them meaning?  It seems to me this is a different, and
additional, requirement over and above CC.
>
> Brent
>
>
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