On Friday, August 15, 2014, LizR <[email protected] <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:
> On 15 August 2014 12:40, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> If counterfactual correctness and causal environmental reference are >> not needed for consciousness then consciousness will be instantiated by any >> sequence of states, >> > > OK. From which I can only deduce that either consciousness isn't related > (purely) to classical computational states, but requires some extras, or it > can be instantiated in ANY sequence of states that meet some set of > criteria, regardless of whether these occur in a rock or a Boltzmann brain > or whatever. (Or indeed in a book called "Einstein's Brain" that I read > about in another book by Doug Hofstadter.) > I think these sorts of considerations show that the physical states cannot be responsible for generating or affecting consciousness. The immediate objection to this is that physical changes in the brain *do* affect consciousness. But if physical states cannot be responsible for generating or affecting consciousness, there can be no evidence for a separate, fundamental physical world. What we are left with is the platonic reality in which all computations are realised and physical reality is a simulation. It is meaningless to ask if consciousness supervenes on the computations implemented on the simulated rock or the simulated recording. --Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
