On 20 Aug 2014, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
> Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd
say yes to the doctor.
> It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device
work on someone else first.
> If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll
go under the knife - and
> have to swallow the logical consequences whole! Your reply
helps. I suppose what I feel
> is missing from the account is the *necessity* of qualia,
because it seems to me that
> everything that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in
the comp account, the
> necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics remains
mysterious. My guess is
> that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot
more right than
> materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general
relativity and QM are "wrong",
> i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next step is to read the
Amoeba's Secret and see if
> I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p & p -
the maths is still
> largely a mystery to me.
>
> However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more
curious questions to you about
> the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes,
there's no universe, I know,
> but I lack words: this apparent "space" we inhabit?). The
question comes up in the comp
> account about the physical explanation for the origin of the
Löbian organism the
> self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance of matter
(allegedly). Liz and
> Brent were throwing around this "if a tree falls in the forest"
question on the MGA
> thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the
long, deep history of matter
> sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative
origin story if the
> observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to recall you
talking about the idea
> that the observer's self consistency demands that it also find
a consistent account of
> itself in the "material hypostases". OK, I can go with that,
but something here still
> troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive
any more than we can
> dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as
fictive. How do you see the
> relationship between these accounts (the exterior physical and
the machine
> psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic
explanation of the fluky
> coincidences of the laws of nature resembles the machine
psychology account - in that
> the requirements of existing as a complex self-aware machine in
a sense "cause" the laws
> of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical
consistency constrains the
> environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's
almost strange that it's
> taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is that
the "laws" work, that they
> are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see.
Check out the book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by my friend Vic
Stenger. It goes *part*
way in explaining this.
I'm not sure how much more explanation it requires. The anthropic
principle plus multiverse will do it, won't it?
Stenger's approach to physics is that it is based on point-of-view-
invariance, i.e. we want physical laws to hold for everyone in
every time and place and direction and state of motion,
and...whatever else we can include. It's sort of what we mean by
"physical law" in contrast to geographical or historical
accident. He shows that we can get a suprising amount out of this
(at least surprising if you don't already know who Emma Noether
was).
... or if you don't know the consequence of comp, where physics is
1) invaruant for all universal machine
But within comp that's just a definition of "physics". It doesn't
tell you what the invariants are.
?
The invariant are given by the Z1* logics, and some variant.
Noether's theorem relates symmetry in a Lagrangian to a conserved
quantity.
The UDA generalizes this for the whole physics.
2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a
universal machine
I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE". Who is doing the
choosing?
You, or me. I mean anyone interested in Everything.
Under comp we've already assumed a universal dovetailer.
It is the choice of the basic Turing universal formalism.
We don't assume a universal dovetailer. Its existence is derivable from:
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
Or from any Turing universal axioms. So an another TOE is:
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
Emmy Noether stiil needs a notion of space, or direction, and
time ..., or some physical universe; but she makes indeed already a
good deal in the derivation of physical laws from "first
principle", notably that the laws should be invariant for the
observer in a universe (still assumed).
It's a theorem of mathematics so it applies to any theory based on
Lagrangian mechanics.
Which already presupposes much of physics. We can't use it for the
mind-body problem. Physics per se just doesn't work, as UDA explains.
Bruno
The physics is in finding what Lagrangian applies.
Brent
Comp generalizes this in the extreme. Note that all this is in the
line of Galilee, Einstein, Noether, and Everett (and others).
Bruno
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