On 25 August 2014 15:56, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/24/2014 6:21 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 25 August 2014 08:43, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> That's because Bruno rejects the link between 1) and 2) and takes >> computation to exist in Platonia, independent of physics. So of course >> with that assumption physics needs to either be explained from computation >> (Bruno's program) or have it's own dualist basis. I'm not so sure Platonia >> exists. Look up the old archive debates between Bruno and Peter Jones. >> > > If I understand Bruno's arguement correctly, that isn't an assumption, > it's a deduction. He assumes physical and classical computation until he > gets to the MGA, which apparently shows that we have to reject the > assumption of physical computation, although I still don't really > understand how (and all the talk of counterfactuals hasn't helped, as yet, > unfortunately). > > The whole comp programme may of course be scuppered if consciousness > requires quantum computation and the existence of a multiverse. Or it may > not, since quantum computation (apparently) only speeds up classical > computation. Alternatively, if a multiverse is necessary, then maybe that > shows that consciousness is a larger phenomenon than is dreamt of, even in > Bruno's philosophy, and we experience only a tiny sliver of it, at least in > this universe? > > I think the idea is that quantum randomness is just > first-person-indeterminancy relative to the universes of the multiverse. > The holographic principle would imply that the information content of any > universe is always finite. If there are infinitely many universes (per > eternal inflation) then there would be infinitely many copies of distinct > universe. Or invoking Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles there would be > finitely many distinct universes, but the number of those that are > expanding would increase without bound. So that would all be consistent > with "comp". > > Yes, I agree. I can't offhand see why the multiverse makes a difference to the Maudlin argument (even though I just re-re-read Russell's paper on the subject, in case I realised what I'm missing), or why it makes a difference to anything in comp - up to the MGA, at least.
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