> On 26 Aug 2014, at 6:48 pm, "Alberto G. Corona " <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> After some time going trough these topics one reach the conclusion that these
> "explanations" are nothing more than computer fashion applied to the wrong
> kind of problem.
"One" reaches this conclusion. That "one" is you and you alone.
> And second, to hide with new terms the immense pride craziness and vacuum in
> this circular phrase,
Which phrase?
> that summarizes everything said in this boring discussion group:
If it's so boring, why do you keep showing up here? There can be only one
answer to that. You NEED people to not only understand your views. You want
others to LOVE you for them. You hanker for respect and for recognition. You
need others to AGREE with you because that increases your egoic pride and sense
of self-worth. You need this list more than this list needs you.
>
> (1)We reject any ultimate meaning and purpose,
Define "ultimate meaning and purpose" in a way that is not just a statement of
your personal preferences and prejudices. You cannot. You are a ragbag of
intolerance and fascistic thinking.
> therefore, to explain the presence of purpose, laws of nature and order, then
> this order must be local, and every other non ordered variants must exist.
> There must exist nothing and everything at the same time. The universe has
> zero information and has no meaning because we reject meaning and purpose.
> goto (1)
How can the universe have no meaning because a bunch of people in the 21st
century sitting behind computer screens and conversing with each other in a way
that irritates you happens on a daily basis. I think you are due for a trip to
the psychiatrist.
>
> "everything is trivial if the universe is not engaged in a metaphysical
> adventure" - Nicolás Gómez Dávila
>
This guy seems a bit of a scewball too. Define "metaphysical adventure". Now
that's a pretty meaningless phrase. Maybe go have a lie down or watch TV for a
change. You have said nothing of any value in this post except parade your
fascistic intolerance once again.
Kim
>
> 2014-08-23 3:46 GMT+02:00 David Nyman <[email protected]>:
>> I must confess that I've been reading the MGA revisited thread with a
>> certain sense of frustration (notwithstanding that Russell has made a pretty
>> good fist of clarifying some key points). My frustration is that I have
>> never been able to see why we need an elaborate reductio like the MGA to
>> dispose decisively of a *computational* theory of mind on the basis of a
>> primitive materiality. The crux of the argument is whether the
>> "computational" part of the theory can be reduced without ambiguity to the
>> action of a physical device (e.g. a computer or a brain). If not, what we're
>> left with looks like a crypto-materialist theory in computationalist
>> disguise. In point of fact I agree with Stathis that multiple realisability
>> is already sufficient to establish this point. But let me elaborate a little
>> further. When we consider the matter, we don't actually observed
>> "computation" (in any rigorous mathematical sense) in physical reality. What
>> we observe in practice are physical devices of various kinds (indeed, in
>> principle, indefinitely many kinds) that we accept FAPP as adequately
>> instantiating particular classes of computation within certain fairly
>> stringent limits. To put it another way, we are prepared to interpret the
>> normal physical behaviour of such devices *as if* it instantiated the
>> mathematical notion of computation. But at all times it is sufficient to
>> assume that such behaviour, be it of computers or brains, is constrained
>> exclusively and exhaustively by physical law. It's their net action, as
>> physical devices, that is at all times assumed to be essential, whatever
>> "computational" (or other) interpretation may be ascribed to them
>> externally. Unfortunately, these otherwise rather obvious facts tend to be
>> obscured in ordinary, and even in technical, discourse by the free
>> intermixing of software and hardware paradigms.
>>
>> These considerations should make it clear that any description of the normal
>> behaviour of a physical device as computation can only be in a sense that
>> is, ultimately, metaphorical. This extends to any software re-description of
>> physical action, as for example Brent's Mars Rover analogy, or Dennett's
>> "third-person absolutist" take on perception and cognition. On the
>> assumption of a "primitive physical reality", such descriptions can (and
>> indeed must) be understood as metaphorical and approximate, not literal and
>> "absolute". They are grounded in the assumption of their ultimate
>> reducibility, and approximate equivalence, to some kind of net physical
>> action. In this light, physical devices don't literally "compute"; the most
>> we need to say is that their physical behaviour adequately *approximates*
>> computation, under suitable interpretation and within certain limits. Under
>> such constraints, it would seem that a so-called "computational" theory of
>> mind could in fact amount to nothing other than the claim that consciousness
>> is a *state of matter*. This particular state of matter, it would be
>> claimed, must obtain whenever physical action happens to be approximately
>> re-describable (at some arbitrary level) in terms of a certain class of
>> computation. But given that the theory is grounded, and is at all times
>> expressible, in terms of an explicitly physical, as distinct from
>> mathematical, ontology, it is hard to discern how such a "computational"
>> stipulation could contribute anything intelligible to the claim.
>>
>> ISTM that the foregoing considerations are sufficient, on their own merits,
>> to establish the necessity of the reversal at Step 8, if a *computational*
>> (as distinct from some sort of tacitly crypto-material) theory of
>> consciousness, is to be salvaged. If so, it is indeed clear that the task
>> becomes at least twice as hard as before, as the observed correlations
>> between matter and consciousness now have to be justified on the basis of an
>> ontology that is (mathematically) adequate for a general and rigorous (as
>> distinct from local and approximate) emulation of computation.
>>
>> David
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>
>
> --
> Alberto.
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