scientist -> scientistic or scientifist
2014-08-27 11:24 GMT+02:00 Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]>: > Well there are some interesting things in this list. It is specially > interesting for the study of the scientist mindset, but not only that. > > The projections of your own wishes and phobias on me is not worth > considering. > > > 2014-08-26 12:37 GMT+02:00 Kim Jones <[email protected]>: > > >> >> >> On 26 Aug 2014, at 6:48 pm, "Alberto G. Corona " <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> After some time going trough these topics one reach the conclusion that >> these "explanations" are nothing more than computer fashion applied to the >> wrong kind of problem. >> >> >> >> "One" reaches this conclusion. That "one" is you and you alone. >> >> >> And second, to hide with new terms the immense pride craziness and vacuum >> in this circular phrase, >> >> >> >> Which phrase? >> >> >> that summarizes everything said in this boring discussion group: >> >> >> >> If it's so boring, why do you keep showing up here? There can be only one >> answer to that. You NEED people to not only understand your views. You want >> others to LOVE you for them. You hanker for respect and for recognition. >> You need others to AGREE with you because that increases your egoic pride >> and sense of self-worth. You need this list more than this list needs you. >> >> >> >> (1)We reject any ultimate meaning and purpose, >> >> >> >> Define "ultimate meaning and purpose" in a way that is not just a >> statement of your personal preferences and prejudices. You cannot. You are >> a ragbag of intolerance and fascistic thinking. >> >> >> >> therefore, to explain the presence of purpose, laws of nature and order, >> then this order must be local, and every other non ordered variants must >> exist. There must exist nothing and everything at the same time. The >> universe has zero information and has no meaning because we reject meaning >> and purpose. goto (1) >> >> >> >> How can the universe have no meaning because a bunch of people in the >> 21st century sitting behind computer screens and conversing with each other >> in a way that irritates you happens on a daily basis. I think you are due >> for a trip to the psychiatrist. >> >> >> >> "everything is trivial if the universe is not engaged in a metaphysical >> adventure" - Nicolás Gómez Dávila >> >> >> This guy seems a bit of a scewball too. Define "metaphysical adventure". >> Now that's a pretty meaningless phrase. Maybe go have a lie down or watch >> TV for a change. You have said nothing of any value in this post except >> parade your fascistic intolerance once again. >> >> Kim >> >> >> >> 2014-08-23 3:46 GMT+02:00 David Nyman <[email protected]>: >> >>> I must confess that I've been reading the MGA revisited thread with a >>> certain sense of frustration (notwithstanding that Russell has made a >>> pretty good fist of clarifying some key points). My frustration is that I >>> have never been able to see why we need an elaborate reductio like the MGA >>> to dispose decisively of a *computational* theory of mind on the basis of a >>> primitive materiality. The crux of the argument is whether the >>> "computational" part of the theory can be reduced without ambiguity to the >>> action of a physical device (e.g. a computer or a brain). If not, what >>> we're left with looks like a crypto-materialist theory in computationalist >>> disguise. In point of fact I agree with Stathis that multiple realisability >>> is already sufficient to establish this point. But let me elaborate a >>> little further. When we consider the matter, we don't actually observed >>> "computation" (in any rigorous mathematical sense) in physical reality. >>> What we observe in practice are physical devices of various kinds (indeed, >>> in principle, indefinitely many kinds) that we accept FAPP as adequately >>> instantiating particular classes of computation within certain fairly >>> stringent limits. To put it another way, we are prepared to interpret the >>> normal physical behaviour of such devices *as if* it instantiated the >>> mathematical notion of computation. But at all times it is sufficient to >>> assume that such behaviour, be it of computers or brains, is constrained >>> exclusively and exhaustively by physical law. It's their net action, as >>> physical devices, that is at all times assumed to be essential, whatever >>> "computational" (or other) interpretation may be ascribed to them >>> externally. Unfortunately, these otherwise rather obvious facts tend to be >>> obscured in ordinary, and even in technical, discourse by the free >>> intermixing of software and hardware paradigms. >>> >>> These considerations should make it clear that any description of the >>> normal behaviour of a physical device as computation can only be in a sense >>> that is, ultimately, metaphorical. This extends to any software >>> re-description of physical action, as for example Brent's Mars Rover >>> analogy, or Dennett's "third-person absolutist" take on perception and >>> cognition. On the assumption of a "primitive physical reality", such >>> descriptions can (and indeed must) be understood as metaphorical and >>> approximate, not literal and "absolute". They are grounded in the >>> assumption of their ultimate reducibility, and approximate equivalence, to >>> some kind of net physical action. In this light, physical devices don't >>> literally "compute"; the most we need to say is that their physical >>> behaviour adequately *approximates* computation, under suitable >>> interpretation and within certain limits. Under such constraints, it would >>> seem that a so-called "computational" theory of mind could in fact amount >>> to nothing other than the claim that consciousness is a *state of matter*. >>> This particular state of matter, it would be claimed, must obtain whenever >>> physical action happens to be approximately re-describable (at some >>> arbitrary level) in terms of a certain class of computation. But given that >>> the theory is grounded, and is at all times expressible, in terms of an >>> explicitly physical, as distinct from mathematical, ontology, it is hard to >>> discern how such a "computational" stipulation could contribute anything >>> intelligible to the claim. >>> >>> ISTM that the foregoing considerations are sufficient, on their own >>> merits, to establish the necessity of the reversal at Step 8, if a >>> *computational* (as distinct from some sort of tacitly crypto-material) >>> theory of consciousness, is to be salvaged. If so, it is indeed clear that >>> the task becomes at least twice as hard as before, as the observed >>> correlations between matter and consciousness now have to be justified on >>> the basis of an ontology that is (mathematically) adequate for a general >>> and rigorous (as distinct from local and approximate) emulation of >>> computation. >>> >>> David >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Alberto. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > Alberto. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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