On 09 Oct 2014, at 23:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2014 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-10-09 23:23 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>:
2014-10-09 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 3:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
> As of todays nobody has shown how consciousness works
And what reason do you have to believe that consciousness has
anything to do with solving NP complete problems in polynomial time?
I don't, and I didn't say that. What I said if only you could read,
is that what could render computationalism false is iff
consciousness depends on a non-computable feature of reality
whatever it is (and of course unknown to us for the moment). NP
hard or complete are not a problem, because NP problem *are*
computable. You just affirm that nothing in the reality is non-
computable, and that consciousness is a computational process... I
don't know it, I think it is the most probable... that doesn't
render it true... but for it to be false, it requires some aspect
of consciousness to be non-computable.
For your information such "non-computable" feature could be
"primitive" matter, as Peter Jones liked to point out...
"primitive" matter to be understood as what renders something real
(as opposed to something that doesn't exist)...
positing "primitive" matter in that sense would prevent
consciousness to be only a computational object, by
requiring it to be implemented in (primitive) matter, as such
differentiating abstract computations as not real, non existant,
and matter implemented computations as real... that also means that
all of math per se is inexistant, only math currently implemented
in matter is real... that's what Bruno calls an ad-hoc move to save
materialism and computationalism.
Any theory that bottoms out is going to appear "ad-hoc" in starting
from that primitive. Bruno's theory bottoms out on Church-Turing
computation. It seems to have an advantage over matter based
theories because he thinks he can identify belief with provability
while claiming that matter based theories can't include belief. I
think the latter is doubtful, although I don't know of a fully
worked out theory. That's part of the reason I don't accept his
argument as conclusive.
Hmm... You do like Samiya. You have a theory, that you don't want to
doubt.
All what I explain is that if you take the idea of the digital
truncation you can commit on yourself, and survives in virtue of being
emulated by any universal systems, you get a problem of justifying
your continuations in terms of infinities of computational histories.
Using Matter here is like saying let us introduce some metaphysics to
not do the comparison.
I have no theory. I just take seriously the 1-person-3-person problem.
Comp forces to extend Everett move on the arithmetical realm.
I don't know the answer, I expose the problem. I show also the
machine's solution to the problem and we can compare with nature's
apparent solution.
I don't defend any theory. Just searching, and proposing argument. I
have no claims. There should be no claim in science.
Bruno
Brent
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