On 10 Oct 2014, at 23:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/10/2014 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2014, at 23:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2014 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-10-09 23:23 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>:
2014-10-09 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 3:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
> As of todays nobody has shown how consciousness works
And what reason do you have to believe that consciousness has
anything to do with solving NP complete problems in polynomial
time?
I don't, and I didn't say that. What I said if only you could
read, is that what could render computationalism false is iff
consciousness depends on a non-computable feature of reality
whatever it is (and of course unknown to us for the moment). NP
hard or complete are not a problem, because NP problem *are*
computable. You just affirm that nothing in the reality is non-
computable, and that consciousness is a computational process...
I don't know it, I think it is the most probable... that doesn't
render it true... but for it to be
false, it requires some aspect of consciousness to be non-
computable.
For your information such "non-computable" feature could be
"primitive" matter, as Peter Jones liked to point out...
"primitive" matter to be understood as what renders something
real (as opposed to something that doesn't exist)... positing
"primitive" matter in that sense would prevent consciousness to
be only a computational object, by requiring it to be implemented
in (primitive) matter, as such differentiating abstract
computations as not real, non existant, and matter implemented
computations as real... that also means that all of math per se
is inexistant, only math currently implemented in matter is
real... that's what Bruno calls an ad-hoc
move to save materialism and computationalism.
Any theory that bottoms out is going to appear "ad-hoc" in
starting from that primitive. Bruno's theory bottoms out on
Church-Turing computation. It seems to have an advantage over
matter based theories because he thinks he can identify belief
with provability while claiming that matter based theories can't
include belief. I think the latter is doubtful, although I don't
know of a fully worked out theory. That's part of the reason I
don't accept his argument as conclusive.
Hmm... You do like Samiya. You have a theory, that you don't want
to doubt.
All what I explain is that if you take the idea of the digital
truncation you can commit on yourself, and survives in
virtue of being emulated by any universal systems, you get a
problem of justifying your continuations in terms of
infinities of computational histories.
But that continuation must include a continuation of matter also.
Whether matter is 'primitive' or not it is necessary.
It has to be necessary, and indeed in the constructive sense: its
structure has to be derived from arithmetic, or from the assumption
that there is a universal machine (a weakening of Church thesis).
Using Matter here is like saying let us introduce some metaphysics
to not do the comparison.
I have no theory. I just take seriously the 1-person-3-person
problem. Comp forces to extend Everett move on the arithmetical
realm.
That's disingenuous. You use Bp to interchangably mean "believes p"
and "provable p".
Because I limit myself to a machine which believes in the axioms of
Peano arithmetic, which is enough to talk with that machine, about
that machines and the possibility of some stable realities.
What I say will work for all sound recursively enumerable extension of
PA, like ZF.
If you believe in PA's axioms, then, as far as you are both a machine,
and sufficiently locally consistent, this applies to you.
It is not disingenuous, I have defined classical rational belief by
the modal logic, K, or K4 for the one with more introspection power.
It is standard in the field. It is a bit like accepting that 0 and 1
are *numbers* (which means numerous at the start).
Bruno
Brent
I don't know the answer, I expose the problem. I show also the
machine's solution to the problem and we can compare with nature's
apparent solution.
I don't defend any theory. Just searching, and proposing argument.
I have no claims. There should be no claim in science.
Bruno
Brent
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