On 10/10/2014 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2014, at 23:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2014 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-10-09 23:23 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>:
2014-10-09 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>:
On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 3:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> As of todays nobody has shown how consciousness works
And what reason do you have to believe that consciousness has anything
to do
with solving NP complete problems in polynomial time?
I don't, and I didn't say that. What I said if only you could read, is that
what
could render computationalism false is iff consciousness depends on a
non-computable feature of reality whatever it is (and of course unknown to
us for
the moment). NP hard or complete are not a problem, because NP problem *are*
computable. You just affirm that nothing in the reality is non-computable,
and
that consciousness is a computational process... I don't know it, I think
it is
the most probable... that doesn't render it true... but for it to be false,
it
requires some aspect of consciousness to be non-computable.
For your information such "non-computable" feature could be "primitive" matter, as
Peter Jones liked to point out... "primitive" matter to be understood as what renders
something real (as opposed to something that doesn't exist)... positing "primitive"
matter in that sense would prevent consciousness to be only a computational object, by
requiring it to be implemented in (primitive) matter, as such differentiating abstract
computations as not real, non existant, and matter implemented computations as real...
that also means that all of math per se is inexistant, only math currently implemented
in matter is real... that's what Bruno calls an ad-hoc move to save materialism and
computationalism.
Any theory that bottoms out is going to appear "ad-hoc" in starting from that
primitive. Bruno's theory bottoms out on Church-Turing computation. It seems to have
an advantage over matter based theories because he thinks he can identify belief with
provability while claiming that matter based theories can't include belief. I think
the latter is doubtful, although I don't know of a fully worked out theory. That's
part of the reason I don't accept his argument as conclusive.
Hmm... You do like Samiya. You have a theory, that you don't want to doubt.
All what I explain is that if you take the idea of the digital truncation you can commit
on yourself, and survives in virtue of being emulated by any universal systems, you get
a problem of justifying your continuations in terms of infinities of computational
histories.
But that continuation must include a continuation of matter also. Whether matter is
'primitive' or not it is necessary.
Using Matter here is like saying let us introduce some metaphysics to not do the
comparison.
I have no theory. I just take seriously the 1-person-3-person problem. Comp forces to
extend Everett move on the arithmetical realm.
That's disingenuous. You use Bp to interchangably mean "believes p" and "provable
p".
Brent
I don't know the answer, I expose the problem. I show also the machine's solution to the
problem and we can compare with nature's apparent solution.
I don't defend any theory. Just searching, and proposing argument. I have no claims.
There should be no claim in science.
Bruno
Brent
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