On 16 Oct 2014, at 22:53, LizR wrote:
On 16 October 2014 17:00, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote:
I suggest that believing and not believing in anything is consistent
with MWI (and therefore comp) for if you believe something in one
world, you will fail to believe in it in some other world.
That's equivalent to extending the meaning of "you" to cover "your
multiverse self" - a move that's kind-of implicit in using the MWI
(and Bruno's teleporter) for probability calculations (but less so
in quantum suicide, perhaps...)
There is no world with 2+2=5.
More, there are no normal world with unicornes.
Anything does not follow from computationalism, nor from QM.
If there is no proof of the Riemann hypothesis shorter than one giga,
then you will kill yourself in all worlds, if you decide to kill
yourself in the worlds where such proof does not appear on your
(quantum superposed) screen. Well, you might survive in the worlds
where you believe such a proof is on your screen, but you will be wrong.
Bruno
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