On 2/5/2015 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
To simplify, you can consider a competence as an ability to follow a program P_i or to
compute the corresponding partial or total function phi_i.
Learning can then be described as the inverse: finding i (or j ...) when you are
presented with a sample (perhaps infinitely growing) of input and output of phi_i (=
phi_j, ...).
There is a general theory of such learning (for both machine and non-machine). There is
no universal learner (Putnam), unless you weaken very strongly the criteria of
identification of phi_i. If you allow unbounded finite errors, infinite changes of mind,
including changes of mind when the learning machine has already find a correct program
(modulo the finite number of errors), then you have a (very) theoretical notion of
universal learner (Case & Smith), but it can be shown necessarily impractical (Harrington).
So learning is usually considered as a different kind of competence, even if it will be
itself related to the code of an inference inductive machine, and so is a form of
competence too.
Exactly my point.
But intelligence is not a competence per se: it is the natural state of all universal
machine, before someone installs Windows or Christian Dogma, or ...
That entails that intelligence is not only different from competence, it is complimentary
to competence. Intelligence=incompetence. I think that is a reductio. As you agreed
above, the ability to learn is a kind of competence and intelligence requires that much
competence, even if it doesn't require any other specific competences.
...
It will be conscious at the place where it confuses itself with the (relatively real)
environment. OK. It depends also on its abilities, and you can make it self-conscious
by adding enough induction axioms. Don't put to much induction axioms, as Mars Rover
will get stuck in self dialog about its consciousness and how to convince those
self-called [censored] humans!
So without the to-many induction axioms it will be conscious, but not
self-conscious.
Yes, but I have still difficulties on this (not to mention my dialog with salvia which
makes things more weird and counter-intuitive. I feel I still miss something. I might be
unconsciously restrained by some prejudices and probably don't yet push the logic of
comp far enough).
Thus you agree that consciousness is not all-or-nothing.
"Being conscious" is all-or-nothing, but the content, intensity and atmosphere can vary
greatly.
I identify "being conscious" with "there is consciousness", and this is binary, as there
is no degree of unconsciousness (Quentin).
But that's just like saying "being a Belgian" is binary. You can pick any predicate and
say it is "binary" because it divides the world into x such that P(x) or ~P(x). It's a
meaningless tautology and it obfuscates the fact that there are different kinds and
degrees of consciousness.
But some state of consciousness, (like in sleep), remembered in other state of
consciousness (like after awaken) can seem (and perhaps be) less intense, blurred,
fuzzy, etc.
It is generally very difficult to compare a first person experience with another one,
including our own. The intimacy of that state precludes any direct comparison. Memories
are eliminated, colors can be added, ...
But can they be added by any consciousness? I don't think my thermostat can add colors to
the temperature. I doubt that color blind persons can add color.
We live a constant tyranny of the here-and-now present state, which can embellish or
impoverish the re-enacting of a past experience.
Yes and isn't that a defining characteristic of consciousness: it's here-and-now. That's
one of the difficulties of models like UD computation; how do you recover here-and-nowness
from a timeless model. Of course the same problem occurs in physics because we want our
theories to be timeless and even time-symmetric.
Brent
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