2015-02-05 19:25 GMT+01:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: > On 2/5/2015 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> ... >> >> To simplify, you can consider a competence as an ability to follow a >> program P_i or to compute the corresponding partial or total function phi_i. >> Learning can then be described as the inverse: finding i (or j ...) when >> you are presented with a sample (perhaps infinitely growing) of input and >> output of phi_i (= phi_j, ...). >> >> There is a general theory of such learning (for both machine and >> non-machine). There is no universal learner (Putnam), unless you weaken >> very strongly the criteria of identification of phi_i. If you allow >> unbounded finite errors, infinite changes of mind, including changes of >> mind when the learning machine has already find a correct program (modulo >> the finite number of errors), then you have a (very) theoretical notion of >> universal learner (Case & Smith), but it can be shown necessarily >> impractical (Harrington). >> So learning is usually considered as a different kind of competence, even >> if it will be itself related to the code of an inference inductive machine, >> and so is a form of competence too. >> > > Exactly my point. > > But intelligence is not a competence per se: it is the natural state of >> all universal machine, before someone installs Windows or Christian Dogma, >> or ... >> > > That entails that intelligence is not only different from competence, it > is complimentary to competence. Intelligence=incompetence. I think that is > a reductio. As you agreed above, the ability to learn is a kind of > competence and intelligence requires that much competence, even if it > doesn't require any other specific competences. > > >> ... >> >> >>>> It will be conscious at the place where it confuses itself with the >>>> (relatively real) environment. OK. It depends also on its abilities, and >>>> you can make it self-conscious by adding enough induction axioms. Don't put >>>> to much induction axioms, as Mars Rover will get stuck in self dialog about >>>> its consciousness and how to convince those self-called [censored] humans! >>>> >>> >>> So without the to-many induction axioms it will be conscious, but not >>> self-conscious. >>> >> >> Yes, but I have still difficulties on this (not to mention my dialog with >> salvia which makes things more weird and counter-intuitive. I feel I still >> miss something. I might be unconsciously restrained by some prejudices and >> probably don't yet push the logic of comp far enough). >> >> >> >> Thus you agree that consciousness is not all-or-nothing. >>> >> >> "Being conscious" is all-or-nothing, but the content, intensity and >> atmosphere can vary greatly. >> >> I identify "being conscious" with "there is consciousness", and this is >> binary, as there is no degree of unconsciousness (Quentin). >> > > But that's just like saying "being a Belgian" is binary. You can pick any > predicate and say it is "binary" because it divides the world into x such > that P(x) or ~P(x). It's a meaningless tautology and it obfuscates the > fact that there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness.
But there aren't any different kinds and degrees of unconsciousness... if you're not conscious, you're not conscious... that's all there is to it... that there are different kinds or ways of being conscious is not in dispute... Quentin > > > But some state of consciousness, (like in sleep), remembered in other >> state of consciousness (like after awaken) can seem (and perhaps be) less >> intense, blurred, fuzzy, etc. >> >> It is generally very difficult to compare a first person experience with >> another one, including our own. The intimacy of that state precludes any >> direct comparison. Memories are eliminated, colors can be added, ... >> > > But can they be added by any consciousness? I don't think my thermostat > can add colors to the temperature. I doubt that color blind persons can > add color. > > We live a constant tyranny of the here-and-now present state, which can >> embellish or impoverish the re-enacting of a past experience. >> > > Yes and isn't that a defining characteristic of consciousness: it's > here-and-now. That's one of the difficulties of models like UD > computation; how do you recover here-and-nowness from a timeless model. Of > course the same problem occurs in physics because we want our theories to > be timeless and even time-symmetric. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
