On 11 March 2015 at 08:30, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > If I develop a theory of consciousness that consists of statements about > neurons and chemicals and ion flux and it predicts when we will see a > person behaving in the way we call conscious and when not; even predicting > when they will appear sad or happy or angry. Is that not a falsifiable, > material theory of consciousness? Couldn't its predictions be empirically > wrong? >
Yes of course they could. That isn't at issue, as far as I know. > And if they were wrong, wouldn't they be equally wrong whether or not > primary materialism (whatever that means) were true. > > Yes, that was my point. Primary materialism is the theory that there is no deeper explanation for existence (or consciousness, specifically, in this discussion) than the fact that matter exists. In discussions on this list "primary materialism" is often abbreviated to just "materialism", presumably to save time and wear and tear on the fingers / keyboards of those involved. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
