On 16 Mar 2015, at 02:15, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote
> consciousness may be an necessary spandrel of brain architecture,
but NOT of intelligence in general.
The same drugs that make me behave stupidly also makes me feel less
conscious,
It depends on the drug. Some drugs make you behave "stupidly", because
it makes you amnesic, or "worst" amnesic + a dreamy scenario, like in
a dream. But some of those experience are known to be lived with a
feeling of a higher type of consciousness.
Salvia is typical in that regards because it generates (30% of time) a
"super-dream" argument. Indeed you hallucinate that you wake up, and
that your life was a dream". You can felt being awake for the first
time ... since a *very* long time.".
From outside you just droll on the carpet, unable to walk or even
sit. From inside the state of consciousness can be remarkably
different, and felt as more intense, and eventually incredibly familiar.
and that fact is incompatible with the above idea.
I agree with your conclusion; intelligence and consciousness are
deeply related, perhaps for spandrel-like type of reason.
But Intelligence is not competence. It is more primitive, as the
condition allowing competences to add and multiply. We need
intelligence to develop competence, and consciousness is a sort of
mystical belief in a reality (including or not oneself) which gives
the means to develop higher goal needed to make sense of the
competence. We need competence to find the food, we need consciousness
to appreciate it, and made worth the search.
Now, both salvia's reports and arithmetic suggest that consciousness
requires a relation with truth, like with the cartesian fixed point of
the doubt.
You can find a fixed point for all the "self" logics with the
intensional nuances NOT having "& p" in the definition, like []p, and
[]p & <>t.
For the simple box (Gödel's beweisbar), the fixed point is
consistency. For []p & <>t, it gives []f v <><>t. This can be use to
refine different interpretations of the cogito of Descartes. I used it
in "Conscience and Mécanisme" to show that Malcom's argument that
machine cannot think is isomorphic with his argument that dream does
not exist.
It can help to understand the coherence of Theaetetus' definition of
knowledge with the dream argument.
The "self" logics with "& p", like []p & p, and []p & <>t & p, are
immune to the fixed point. They are not definable, and so cannot be
diagonalized. They can't believe rationally that they are machine, and
can even refute all attempts to theorize they are. If they say "yes"
to a doctor, they are aware of the non rationalizable jump/hope.
Here to, consciousness and conscience have a role. I think. A role of
logico-Turing-universal spandrel, perhaps.
Bruno
John K Clark
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