On 3/22/2015 5:38 PM, LizR wrote:
OK, thanks.
Well, yes, it's true that I hadn't heard the term except in places like this...
So anyway, the argument that the exact arrangement of the substrate isn't necessary for
consciousness means that the same experiences could be generated by different
arrangements of a given substrate, or perhaps completely different substrates (which may
just be a statement of computational universality, or something similar?)
That in itself doesn't make the substrate /unnecessary/ to consciousness, surely? It's
just saying that there isn't a one-to-one mapping, and (for example) silicon or carbon
brains might in theory generate the same states. So a given conscious experience doesn't
supervene on the exact same configuration of the substrate... So maybe it doesn't always
matter to my experience if my brain has, say, 100 or 101 ions in a particular synapse
(or 1000000 and 1000001 - I have no idea what figures are realistic).
I'm not sure how you get from that to the non-primariness of matter, however.
That's where the MGA comes in. It purports to show that one of the possible substrates is
inert matter, which seems so absurd that we should conclude the matter plays no part
whatsoever.
Brent
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