On 3/23/2015 3:59 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 March 2015 at 11:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
Or you can throw out the assumption that conscious thought is independent
of an
external world. This assumption comes easily to Platonist because they
think
Platonia exists independent of any worlds; but I find it very suspicious.
Doesn't that take you back to the starting point of Bruno's argument? If conscious
thought depends on the world, then either it's a computation, or part of one (apparently
the argument works even if you have to assume the HUbble sphere is digitally
simulatable, if that's the right word) - in which case we seem led inexorably to the
UDA/MGA/TLA - or it's something else.
What else could it be?
The difference is that you can't separate out a material instantiation of a computation
and say that because it can be inert that shows that consciousness doesn't need matter.
If consciousness is computation then it can be implemented in different substances, but
there must be a whole world implemented in that substance too for the consciousness to be
conscious OF. The projected sequence of the MGA isn't conscious in this world because it
doesn't interact with this world. We tend to intuit that it's conscious because we see the
causal connection to this world, but to be conscious it would have to be part of a whole
projected world in which it acted. This is not longer so radical. It's just saying to
could digitally simulate a world and conscious beings within it. The simulation might
look inert to us in our world, as it would if it were just written out on paper, but from
within the simulation it would look dynamic.
Brent
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